

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



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June 8, 1959

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U.S. Continues Presentation of Western Peace Plan in Second Week of Foreign Ministers Conference

Statements by Secretary Herter¹

STATEMENT OF MAY 18

The Government of the United States attaches the greatest value to a just and enduring peace settlement with Germany. Ever since the termination of hostilities in 1945 the United States has steadfastly sought to bring about such a settlement.

The record on this score is clear and unequivocal. At the first meeting of the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (Paris, 1946) Secretary of State Byrnes suggested that a special commission be appointed to consider a German peace treaty. On May 15, 1946, he proposed the appointment of special deputies to prepare a draft peace settlement for Germany which the Council could submit to a peace conference to be convened on November 12, 1946. At the third Council of Foreign Ministers session (New York, 1946) Secretary Byrnes insisted that the Council should immediately appoint its deputies for Germany and that these deputies should explore the problem prior to the Moscow session.

The United States continued to press for the conclusion of a peace settlement with Germany at the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris in 1949. Renewed efforts were made at the Berlin discussions in 1954 and at Geneva in 1955. The position consistently taken by the United States in favor of a final peace settlement with Germany is thus a matter of public record.

Throughout this long period the great concern of the United States has been that a peace settle-

ment with Germany shall truly be all that its name implies—the establishment by solemn international undertakings of relationships between a free and united Germany and the other nations of the world which will promote peace upon earth. A settlement which is not designed to achieve this result would be a fraud upon the hopes of mankind.

All of these efforts on the part of the United States to bring about a definitive peace settlement with Germany were frustrated by the intransigent attitude of the Soviet Union. In particular, the constructive proposals of the United States were brought to naught by the continued refusal of the Soviet Union to fulfill its solemn obligation to join with the Western allies in bringing about the reunification of Germany and the establishment of an all-German government, freely chosen by the German people.

Considerations for Formulation of Treaty Terms

In considering the feasibility of a "peace treaty" with Germany we must keep in mind certain fundamental considerations which must underlie any formulation of specific treaty terms. The United States on December 11, 1941, declared war on Nazi Germany and thereafter engaged in a major conflict with that state. Nazi Germany capitulated unconditionally in 1945.

At all times, prior to the capitulation, the Nazi government of Germany was the government of all of Germany.

It is the position of the United States that under international law the international entity known as Germany remains in existence, notwithstanding what has happened since 1945 as an incident of Four Power occupation. The Government of the United States does not consider, and

¹For statements made by Mr. Herter during the first week of the Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva, together with the text of the Western peace plan and the announcement of the U.S. delegation, see *BULLETIN* of June 1, 1959, p. 775.

will not admit, that Germany as an international entity is permanently divided into new and separate states, as was the case of Austria after World War I.

It is undeniable that a peace treaty necessarily connotes a final settlement of the problems engendered by war, such as frontiers, treaty obligations, claims and debts, and the like. It was the international entity known as Germany with which the United States was at war and with which it has outstanding problems. Accordingly, any "final settlement," so far as our Governments are concerned, must await the establishment of a government which can act for and bind Germany as a whole.

Conversely, since the United States was never at war with the Federal Republic of Germany nor with the so-called "German Democratic Republic," any "peace treaty" or definitive settlement with such portions of Germany, whether individually or collectively, could not be a final peace treaty with Germany.

To hold otherwise would be to recognize in effect the permanent partition of Germany.

The Bonn conventions entered into by the Western Powers and the German Federal Republic are in no way inconsistent with the position of the United States I have just set forth. The United States participated in the Bonn conventions because it considered that the people of West Germany should be permitted to assume as normal an international role as possible under the circumstances. It appears on the face of the Bonn conventions that they constitute merely an effort to achieve an interim solution to the problem resulting from the lack of a definitive peace treaty.

Specifically, in the Bonn conventions it is made clear that these arrangements are of an interim nature pending a final peace settlement. While the Federal Republic is recognized as having the full authority of a sovereign over its own internal and external affairs, the three Western Powers retain all the rights and responsibilities exercised or held by them relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, including reunification of Germany and a peace settlement.

It should be noted also that a similar reservation was made by the Soviet Government in its arrangements of September 20, 1955, with the so-called German Democratic Republic.

Why, it may be asked, cannot the United States negotiate and enter into a peace treaty of the

nature proposed by the Soviet Union, in which it is suggested that "Germany" be represented by the German Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic, pending establishment of an all-German government? The answer is clear and fundamental. The German Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic do not, either separately or in combination, constitute an all-German government authorized to act for and bind the international entity known as Germany. That can be done only by an all-German government, freely chosen by the German people.

True, the Soviet Union in its proposal pays lip service to the principle that any peace settlement, to be worthy of the name, must be with the whole of Germany, by the patent device of referring to "Germany" as the contracting party to the treaty. But the "Germany" of the Soviet proposal is a nonentity, and the only real parties are the Federal Republic of Germany and the so-called German Democratic Republic.

Quite aside from the question of recognition of the so-called German Democratic Republic—and the United States wishes to reiterate that it has no intention of recognizing the so-called German Democratic Republic as representative of any part of the German people—it is only by closing one's eyes to reality that one is able to regard the "Germany" of the Soviet proposal as anything of substance.

For example, the widely divergent views of the German Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic are matters of common knowledge. Yet article 3 of the Soviet draft "treaty" provides:²

The Allied and Associated States recognize the full sovereignty of the German people over Germany, including the territorial waters and airspace.

Sovereignty of a State Is Indivisible

In international relations the sovereignty of a state is one and indivisible. The concept of "two existing German states" representing the indivisible sovereignty of the German people is unacceptable, both in legal and in political theory, and would be wholly unworkable in practice. Who, it may be asked, will represent a sovereign "Germany" or "the German people" in other capitals or in the United Nations? To whom will the

² For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 9, 1959, p. 337.

other signatories of the treaty look for fulfillment of the obligations of "Germany" under the Soviet proposal?

Article 4 places upon Germany the obligation to solve international disputes by peaceful means and forbids it to extend any aid or support to another state or group of states violating international peace and security.

What would be the result if the so-called German Democratic Republic extended aid to a state which was violating international peace? Would not the Federal Republic of Germany be under an obligation to prevent such support? The Federal Republic might well be required, in view of the unconditional nature of the obligation which is placed upon "Germany" not to extend aid or support in such circumstances, to take measures to disassociate itself from the so-called German Democratic Republic. In view of conditions under which it is likely to be enforced this article could well serve as a threat to international peace and security rather than a safeguard against violations thereof.

The Soviet draft treaty contains, all told, some 48 articles, and in one article after another the same series of problems arises. Upon what entity does a particular obligation rest? To what entity does a particular right accrue? How are rights and obligations to be carried out? How are violations thereof to be treated? It is clearly not necessary to go through the entire draft specifying the vast number of problems which are inherent in this Soviet proposal. The obvious problems stemming from the articles which have been discussed afford ample illustration of the point that this treaty proposal, purely from the practical point of view, would not lead to a settlement of the German problem but instead would create a host of new problems.

The only sound disarmament program is one which is generally applicable, is not directed in a discriminatory manner against a single state, and is backed by meaningful and enforceable measures to insure its accomplishment.

At the Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin in 1954, Secretary of State Dulles, in discussing the unhappy consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, stated:³

From that experiment, those who truly and wisely seek peace have learned that no great nation is made harmless by subjecting it to discriminations so that it

cannot be an equal in the family of nations. Restrictions such as were imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, and as are implicit in the Soviet proposals of yesterday, merely incite a people of vigor and of courage to strive to break the bonds imposed upon them and thereby to demonstrate their sovereign equality.

This wise counsel is equally applicable to the current Soviet proposals respecting the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Germany. The United States has studied the draft peace treaty with Germany which was attached to the Soviet note of January 10, 1959,⁴ with great care in the hope that it might open a path to the establishment of a permanent peace settlement. Had it in fact done so, the United States would have welcomed it. But the Soviet proposal instead holds the seeds of future discord and conflict.

STATEMENT OF MAY 20

This conference is now well into its second week. It is most appropriate that we review our respective positions in the light of our objectives here. We are in Geneva to seek positive agreements on the German question; to narrow the differences between us; and thus to make constructive proposals for discussions in a possible summit meeting.

The United States delegation has come here with the high purpose of engaging in serious and meaningful negotiations. We have repeatedly stated that, if developments here justify it, we will be ready to participate in a summit meeting; otherwise, not.

What was the occasion for our coming together at this time? All the world knows that there has been no change in the situation relating to Berlin since 1949, when the Soviet Union solemnly reaffirmed its undertakings with respect to access to that city. The real occasion for this meeting was a series of notes from the Soviet Union beginning in November 1958 demanding discussions with respect to the problems of Berlin and a peace treaty with Germany and making certain proposals with respect to those problems. The counterproposals of the three Western Powers were requested in these notes and in numerous public statements by Soviet officials.

In reply the Government of the United States indicated its willingness to meet here in Geneva to discuss "questions relating to Germany includ-

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 8, 1954, p. 179.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 9, 1959, p. 333.

ing a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin."

The Western peace plan was formulated in the light of these exchanges. It was formulated in the light of positions repeatedly taken and reaffirmed by the Soviet Union. It constitutes an entirely serious attempt to reach an accommodation between the positions taken by the Soviet Union on the one hand and the three Western Powers on the other in the fall of 1955.

We take particular exception to Mr. Gromyko's charge that the Western peace plan was formulated with the objective of reaching disagreement, rather than agreement, here. This is an unusual charge of bad faith to inject into a conference such as this. The falsity of that charge is demonstrated by the judgment of the peoples throughout the world, who have hailed the Western peace plan as a sober and constructive effort to accomplish a relaxation of tensions through negotiations.

When the Western peace plan was presented, however, that peace plan was rejected out of hand by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko. Instead of examining the Western peace plan on its merits, Mr. Gromyko brushed it aside and reiterated his call for an immediate peace treaty with a divided Germany and the withdrawal of all protective forces from West Berlin.

Let us look into the merits of Mr. Gromyko's objections to the Western peace plan. First, he assails it as a "big pile," a "solid knot," a "Gordian knot," of unrelated and difficult proposals which were put forward in a package in order to preclude, rather than to facilitate, agreement here.

Question of Berlin

What are the facts? Let us first take up the Berlin question. The Soviet Union said that it wanted to discuss the problem of Berlin. Anyone with the slightest knowledge of geography knows that Berlin is one city, not two, and that the existing division between East and West Berlin is, of necessity, artificial and temporary. Accordingly the Western peace plan included a proposal for the reunification of Berlin. I wish to emphasize here that Berlin, though surrounded by the territory of the so-called German Democratic Republic, is not located on the territory of the German Democratic Republic nor is it a part of

that territory. From the beginning, as determined by agreements to which the Soviet Union was a party, the Greater Berlin area was excluded from the Soviet Zone and made a special area for Four Power occupation.

The Western peace plan proposes that Berlin be reunified by self-determination on the part of its inhabitants. This would, indeed, be a determination by the Germans themselves. And it should apply to the reunification of Berlin as well as to the reunification of Germany. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, says: "We are not opposed to elections, but it is up to the Germans themselves—the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany—to solve this problem."

Is it not entirely clear by now that this is merely a formula for avoiding free elections? All the world knows well that free elections in Berlin, as well as throughout Germany, can only be assured by the supervision of the Four Powers or some other form of international objective supervision.

Question of Reunification and Peace Treaty

It is further recognized throughout the world that a lasting settlement of the Berlin problem can be brought about only when Germany is reunified and Berlin is permitted to resume its rightful status as the capital of a reunified Germany. Accordingly the Western peace plan contained proposals to bring this about after a stipulated period through the holding of free elections in all of Germany. With due regard to the Soviet Union's insistence that the present moment is not propitious for free all-German elections, the Western peace plan contemplates an intermediate period in which an all-German committee would prepare the basis for such elections. As a major concession on the part of the three Western Powers, in the light of the relative populations of the two parts of Germany, this all-German committee would consist of 25 representatives of the German Federal Republic and 10 representatives of the so-called German Democratic Republic, and its actions would be taken by a three-fourths majority vote. In other words, neither side would have a dominating vote in the committee. This would not constitute an absorption of the German Democratic Republic, as the Soviet Foreign Minister charges.

Indeed, the Western peace plan makes provision for alternate election laws in the event that no such draft law is formulated by the committee within 1 year. The group of members from the Federal Republic, on the one hand, and the group of members from the so-called German Democratic Republic, on the other, would each formulate a draft law approved by a majority of its members. These draft laws would then be submitted to a plebiscite as alternatives. In order for this draft to become law a majority of valid votes in each of the two parts of Germany would be required. Here again is a provision in the Western peace plan which precludes any domination of one part of Germany by the other.

The Soviet Foreign Minister's only answer is to restate the Soviet Union's insistence upon an immediate peace treaty with a divided Germany, under which the question of German reunification would be deferred indefinitely. Everyone knows that under this proposal reunification would be as unlikely as Mr. Khrushchev's "whistling shrimp."

I suggest that an appropriate title for the package put forward by Mr. Gromyko is not "Soviet draft peace treaty with Germany" but rather "Soviet treaty for the permanent partition of Germany."

Now Mr. Gromyko says that, if we enter into a peace treaty with a divided Germany, this will facilitate the reunification of Germany. I should like to have Mr. Gromyko explain the trend of his thought on this subject, because in my view the results of such action by the Four Powers would be precisely the opposite. This appears to be confirmed by the admission by Mr. Gromyko that what he is proposing here is that we divide Germany in the same manner as Austria-Hungary was divided after World War I. Certainly that did not prove to be a road to reunification.

On the other hand, let us look at what the package put forward by the Soviet Foreign Minister contains. As the Foreign Minister of France has pointed out, article 22 of the draft Soviet "peace treaty" with Germany deals specifically with the question of German reunification. Even if this is only lip service to the principle of reunification, I am unable to understand why the Soviet Foreign Minister objects to the Western allies' suggestion that German unification is of necessity a consideration that must be taken into

account in dealing with a solution of the problem of Germany.

Let us contrast the position Foreign Minister Gromyko now takes with that taken by Mr. Molotov, former Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, at San Francisco in 1955. At that time Mr. Molotov insisted upon reunification through free elections, stating,

As far as our proposals, the proposals of the Soviet Union, concerning the reunification of Germany are concerned, we hold the following view: The regime prevailing at present in Eastern Germany should, of course, not be extended to a united Germany any more than should be the regime existing in Western Germany. What regime is to exist and will exist in a reunified Germany—that is a matter which the German people will have to decide for themselves in all-German free elections.

The day before yesterday I expressed the views of the United States delegation on the Soviet Union's proposal for a so-called "peace treaty" with a divided Germany and explained why any such proposal is wholly unacceptable to my Government. I see no need to dwell any further upon the concept of a "peace treaty" with a divided Germany, for it will settle nothing except the permanent or semipermanent partition of that great country.

Question of European Security

As I have previously noted, the Western peace plan also contained proposals directed to the maintenance of European security. It did so in part because of the insistence of the Soviet representatives in 1955 that the problems of Germany and of European security were inextricably linked and their repeated demand that the Western allies pay heed to such insistence. Now the representative of the Soviet Union professes not to understand the linkage between these two related problems.

Let us consider this inability of Mr. Gromyko to understand the linkage between the problem of Germany and the problem of European security. For this purpose let us glance at the so-called "peace treaty" into which the Soviet Union wishes to have us enter with a divided Germany. We find there in articles such as numbers 28, 29, and 30 the Soviet Union's own ideas of measures designed to insure European security in juxtaposition with the Soviet Union's own ideas of a correct solution of the German problem. How

is it possible for Mr. Gromyko to object to exactly the same type of linkage between these two related problems in the Western peace plan?

True it is that the so-called Soviet "peace treaty" concedes the right of Germany to have armed forces for defense. But what does this really mean? The other provisions of the treaty isolate Germany and preclude it from exercising its right of "collective security" guaranteed by article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Certainly the isolated German forces under the Soviet "peace treaty" would have no capability of defending Germany against the Soviet Union with its massive military capabilities.

We make no apology for including in the Western peace plan measures of disarmament, to which the Soviet delegation has taken such strong objection. Here again the connection is obvious and does not require detailed explanation. European security cannot be insured merely by limiting the armed forces of Germany or the armed forces of other states located in Germany. If there is to be any real relaxation of tension in Europe it is essential that there be a limitation upon the military forces and armaments of all major European states, including the Soviet Union. Conversely, the United States recognized that it would be improbable that the Soviet Union would consent to limitations upon its forces and armaments unless comparable limitations were applied to the armed forces and armaments of the United States. It is apparent, therefore, that such general limitations on forces and armaments fall naturally into a peace plan designed to settle the problems of Berlin, of Germany, and of European security. We wish to emphasize, however, that it is not the objective of the three Western Powers to pose general disarmament as a *sine qua non* of reunification or to insist that the reunification of Germany must be coincident with general disarmament measures.

It is obvious, of course, that disarmament discussions would be facilitated if some relaxation of tensions could be secured through the settlement of outstanding political issues.

Why is it, may we again ask, that the Soviet Union is today brusquely rejecting a Western peace plan carefully tailored to meet concerns expressed by the Soviet Union respecting the Western proposals of 1955? Why does the Soviet Union now insist that German reunification be

carried out only by the German Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic? Why has the Soviet Union rejected any linkage between German reunification and European security, when it insisted upon such linkage in 1955, with Mr. Khrushchev in the forefront of that insistence?

The answers are clear, particularly in the light of the Soviet Union's insistence upon an immediate "peace treaty" with a divided Germany and its refusal to consider such a modest step forward as the reunification of Greater Berlin. In 1955, apparently, the Soviet Union, while not wanting German unification, believed that there was a serious possibility of the reunification of Germany and therefore was reasonably concerned that such reunification be accomplished only in such a fashion as to protect the Soviet Union's security interests. Now, apparently, the Soviet Union considers that its security interests are better protected by perpetuating the partition of Germany. If that is the case, it would be better to state it frankly. We cannot accept any such position, and we seriously urge the Soviet delegation to reconsider. It is the teaching of history that the artificial partition of a strong and vigorous people can only result in disaster for those that stand in the way of their reunification. Only the whole German people can be entrusted with the task of determining the future of the German nation. Until the Soviet Union recognizes these self-evident facts and cooperates to this end, there will never be a solution of the German problem or the problem of European security.

No Compromise With Principles

The Western allies have gone far in their effort to meet the preoccupations of the Soviet Union, but there can be no compromise with fundamental principles. We are prepared reluctantly to agree to defer German reunification a little longer, as the Western peace plan reveals, but we are not prepared to give it up, as would be the case if we were to agree to an immediate peace treaty with a divided Germany.

Insofar as the Germans are concerned, the Western peace plan makes ample provision for their participation in the reunification process. Even the officials from the so-called German Democratic Republic can have their place on the all-German committee under conditions which

will not permit the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany to impose their will, despite the numerical superiority of the free West Germans.

Our proposals on European security and disarmament are reasonable and progressive and they deserve the close attention of the Soviet delegation rather than being brushed aside as unworthy of discussion.

The process of negotiation is one of attempting to find a reasonable accommodation between opposing views. The Western peace plan constitutes an earnest and carefully thought out effort to do just that. The Soviet proposals, on the other hand, because in reality they call for an indefinite division of Germany and a withdrawal from West Berlin of the forces on which the people of that city depend for their protection, constitute a long step backward from the positions taken by the Soviet Union in 1955. They are, moreover, inconsistent with the oft-repeated suggestion by the Soviet Union that it will cooperate with the Western allies in an effort to relax tensions. As all know, tensions are the result, not the cause, of disagreements among states.

We call upon the Soviet delegation to cooperate to this end and to engage in serious discussions of our proposals in the days to come.

President Urges Soviet Premier To Accept Test Control Measures

Following is an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with a statement made on May 16 by James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President.

THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

White House (Denver, Colo.) press release dated May 16

MAY 5, 1959

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your reply to my communication of April thirteenth in which I suggested ways in which we might move more rapidly toward the achievement of a lasting agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear

weapons tests under adequately safeguarded conditions.¹

I do not disagree with your statement of the need to conclude a treaty which would provide for the cessation of all types of nuclear weapons tests in the air, underground, under water, and at high altitudes. This is the objective I proposed last August,² which my representatives at Geneva have sought since the beginning of negotiations there,³ and which in my most recent letter I reaffirmed as the goal of the United States. I sincerely hope that your affirmation of this objective will prove to mean that you would now be willing to accept the essential elements of control which would make this possible.

You refer to the possibility mentioned by Prime Minister Macmillan for carrying out each year a certain previously determined number of inspections. I have also been informed that your representative at the Geneva Conference has formally proposed that agreement be reached on the carrying out annually of a predetermined number of inspections, both on the territory of the Soviet Union and on the territories of the United States, the United Kingdom and their possessions. In keeping with our desire to consider all possible approaches which could lead to agreement for discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests with effective control, the United States is prepared to explore this proposal through our representatives in the negotiations at Geneva. In particular it will be necessary to explore the views of the Soviet Government on the voting arrangements under which this and other essential elements of control will be carried out, the criteria which will afford the basis for inspection, and the arrangements which you would be prepared to accept to assure timely access to the site of unidentified events that could be suspected of being nuclear explosions. It will be necessary to know, also, the scientific basis upon which any such number of inspections would be determined and how it would be related to the detection capabilities of the control system. I have noted your understanding that these inspections would not be numerous. The United States has not envisaged an unlimited number of inspections, but adheres to the con-

¹ For the Apr. 13-23 exchange, see BULLETIN of May 18, 1959, p. 704.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1959, p. 700.

cept that the number should be in appropriate relationship to scientific facts and detection capabilities.

As I stated in my last communication, if you are prepared to change your present position on the veto, on procedures for on-site inspection, and on early discussion of concrete measures for high altitude detection, we can proceed promptly in the hope of concluding the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement for suspension of nuclear weapons tests. I hope that your position on these basic issues will change sufficiently to make this possible.

There are reports that your representative in Geneva has given some reason for thinking the Soviet Government may be prepared to modify its approach regarding these questions. If this should prove not to be the case, however, I could not accept a situation in which we would do nothing. In that event I would wish to urge your renewed consideration of my alternative proposal. It is that starting now we register and put into effect agreements looking toward the permanent discontinuance of all nuclear weapons tests in phases, expanding the agreement as rapidly as corresponding measures of control can be incorporated in the treaty. I would again propose that toward this end we take now the first and readily attainable step of an agreed suspension of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere up to the greatest height to which effective controls can under present circumstances be extended.

In my communication of April thirteenth, I suggested that the first phase of such an agreement should extend to the altitude for which controls were agreed upon by the Geneva Conference of Experts last summer.⁴ We would welcome discussions of the feasibility at the present time of extending the first phase atmospheric agreement to higher altitudes and our representatives in the present negotiations at Geneva are prepared to discuss the technical means for controlling such an agreement.

It is precisely because of my deep desire for a complete discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests that I urge again that you either accept the measures of control that will make such agreement possible now or, as a minimum, that you join now in the first step toward this end which is within

⁴ For text of the experts' report, see *ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 453.

our reach. Such a step would assure that no time will be lost in setting up the elements of the system already substantially agreed and in stopping all tests that can be brought under control. While this is being done our negotiators would continue to explore the problems involved in extending the agreement to other weapon tests as quickly as adequate controls can be devised and agreed upon.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

His Excellency

NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV

Chairman of the Council of Ministers

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Moscow

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT

Official translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your answer to my communication to you of April 23rd of this year has been received. The Soviet Government expresses its satisfaction in regard to the statement of the Government of the United States to the effect that the latter does not object to the conclusion of a treaty which would contemplate the cessation of all types of nuclear weapons tests—in the air, underground, under water, and at high altitudes—and that such an agreement is the aim of the United States. In this respect I would like to tell you, Mr. President, that the Soviet Government has always considered and continues to consider that it is precisely such a solution which would fully correspond to the task of preventing the development of new and ever more destructive types of nuclear weapons, and of removing the danger derived from atomic radiation emanating from explosions of such weapons.

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the readiness of the Government of the United States to study the proposal concerning the carrying out, on a yearly basis, of a certain previously determined number of inspections both on the territory of the Soviet Union and on the territories of the U.S.A., Great Britain, and their possessions, if the indications of the instruments of control posts give evidence of the presence of phenomena which might be suspected of being nuclear explosions. We continue to be of the opinion that this proposal constitutes a good basis for a solution of the most difficult problem—the problem of sending inspection teams for investigations on the spot. Obtaining agreement on this proposal would open the way to the conclusion of an accord on the cessation of all types of tests.

With respect to the question raised by you, Mr. President, as to the control of the observance of the agreement on the cessation of tests, and to the opinion of the Soviet Government in respect to the procedure of voting which would determine the implementation of the more

important elements of such control, I should like to bring the following to your attention: We consider that agreement on a previously determined number of visits of inspection teams precludes the necessity of voting or of obtaining agreement on that question within the control commission or within any other organization. The sense of our proposal consists precisely in such an elimination of the question of the so-called "veto" in regard to sending inspection teams on the spot. Inspection teams could, for instance, be sent, within the limitations of the agreed number of visits, upon the request of any of the initial parties to the agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, that is to say: the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and Great Britain, in those cases where the indications of the instruments of control posts provide a basis for suspecting a phenomenon of being a nuclear explosion. We are ready to accept the obligation guaranteeing opportune and unhampered access of the inspection teams to the area within the territory of the Soviet Union in which there are observed phenomena suspected of being an atomic explosion, and to which an appropriate party expresses the desire to send such teams.

We note your statement that the United States does not contemplate an unlimited number of inspections and that you are taking into consideration our opinion, according to which such inspections should not be numerous. You write that the number of such inspections should be in definite conformity with scientific facts and opportunities of detection. But I think that you will agree, Mr. President, that there is hardly any need to engage in a study of any criteria for solving such a simple and obvious problem as determining a specific number of visits of inspection teams. Disputes over criteria of this kind might be conducted endlessly, especially if one of the parties did not aim at concluding an agreement for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet Government considers that it might be possible to agree on a number of inspections which will fully guarantee the possibility of detecting violations of the agreement. In this connection in order to restrain countries which might be tempted to violate the agreement and conduct nuclear explosions secretly, no large number of inspection visits would be necessary, of course. The agreement itself as to a specific number of such verifications will have a sobering effect on all governments which might be inclined to conduct concealed nuclear weapons tests.

As far as the Soviet Government is concerned, we have solemnly stated and do state that even in advance we shall strictly adhere to the agreement and shall not violate the agreement concerning the cessation of tests, which will be signed by us.

But we shall not object to having the question of the number of inspections according to agreement between the initial participants of the treaty revised, shall we say, once every two years, on the basis of the estimate of the experience of the work of the control organization.

I do not think that voting on other questions pertaining to the activity of the control organization would be an obstacle to the conclusion of the agreement. It might

be agreed that the decision on the matter of appointing an administrator, for example, would be undertaken by agreement between the initial treaty members in the control commission, and you do not object to this either. We might be guided by the same principle in appointing the personnel of the control posts, inspection groups, etc.

In your letter, Mr. President, you also raise the question of discussing in the very near future concrete measures for the detection of explosions conducted at high altitudes. We agree that on the matter of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests there would be conducted in a short time a technical discussion of concrete measures as to methods of detecting nuclear explosions at high altitudes on the basis of the conclusion of the Geneva meeting of experts, for the purpose of including such methods in the system of control.

The Soviet Government, whose constant desire is the cessation of all types of nuclear weapons tests in any medium and for all time, which is in keeping with the interests of nations, is convinced that on the basis of the considerations set forth above it may be possible to find a solution to such problems as separate us, and sign such an agreement in the very near future.

With sincere esteem,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

May 14, 1959

STATEMENT BY MR. HAGERTY

White House (Denver, Colo.) press release dated May 16

The President did receive a letter from Premier Khrushchev. It came into Washington late yesterday [May 15]. The President had a translation this morning before he left Washington.

The letter is now under study. It apparently seems to indicate some readiness on the part of Premier Khrushchev to negotiate. However, it is clear that there are parts of his letter that are not at all responsive to the President's letter of May 5th, which is herewith released.

Letters of Credence

Czechoslovakia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Republic, Miloslav Ruzek, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on May 20. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 344.

The Road to a Durable Peace

*by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy*¹

At this moment in our history, when negotiations between representatives of the free nations and of their chief antagonist are taking place in Geneva, we are reminded of the importance of demonstrating, even to those who may hate us, the broad spirit for which Saint Robert Bellarmine was renowned. We know that in such a spirit lies the only road to a durable peace.

Today it might be well to sketch the outlines as I see them of our world which, like that of Saint Robert Bellarmine, is so marked by turbulence and controversy. I would like to touch on some of our thoughts for meeting the challenges and risks we face and perhaps to suggest a few general principles of behavior, personal and national, for dealing with an unpredictable and at times a dangerous situation.

I have mentioned the talks at Geneva. These, as you know, are an important but not necessarily decisive episode of the turbulent postwar years. We would like to hope that these negotiations will prove a sort of watershed, a turning point, in the road toward a more peaceful world. They could be, but in the light of past disappointments we must keep our hopes modest and our defenses high.

A survey of the way stations along the road to Geneva tells us much about what to hope for and what not to hope for in the present situation.

U.S. and Soviet Positions on German Reunification

It is still an open question as to why the Soviet Union chose this particular time to precipitate

the issues over Berlin and Germany. One may speculate that one purpose is to consolidate its position in Eastern Europe, and East Germany especially. No doubt the Kremlin leaders entertain anxieties and apprehensions regarding the solidity of their position in East Germany, which has become increasingly important to them for economic, political, and strategic reasons. No doubt the existence of over 2 million citizens in West Berlin who enjoy freedom from Communist dictation and the success of the free-enterprise system offer a disturbing contrast to the drab regimentation of East Berlin and East Germany generally. No doubt the Soviet Union is apprehensive on the score that this awkward situation actually represents a danger to its entire East European satellite structure because of the adverse psychological impact on the Eastern European population. West Berlin provides an escape route for thousands of refugees seeking freedom from Communist controls and is a thorny exhibit in their midst of the human values inherent in a free society and a free-enterprise system.

No doubt the Soviet proposal for a separate peace treaty for East Germany, in contradiction of the doctrine of German political and economic unity to which the Soviet Union agreed at Potsdam in 1945, is a desperate effort to reverse a trend unfavorable to its European aspirations. Soviet leaders have taken the public position that reunification of Germany is not desired by anyone. This harmonizes with their hope to perpetuate the *status quo* in East Germany and eventually to absorb the West Berlin population in what they describe as the Socialist camp. While we do not propose to disrupt the Eastern European situation by forceful methods, we do not plan to participate in any project which has for its purpose the perpetuation of that situation.

¹ Address made at Louisville, Ky., on May 13 (press release 326) when Mr. Murphy received from Bellarmine College the Bellarmine Medal, which is presented annually to a person in national or international affairs who exemplifies the virtues of justice, charity, and temperateness in dealing with difficult and controversial problems.

We do not propose to lend ourselves to the present Soviet maneuver regarding a separate East German peace treaty.

Whatever the opinion of the Soviet Union may be regarding German reunification, I would doubt that the wishes of the German people themselves can comfortably be ignored. The artificial division of this country, which has existed during the past 14 years, is, I am sure, regarded by the vast majority of Germans as a temporary situation which is bound to be rectified in time. No doubt they, as we, contemplate that this will be accomplished by peaceful and not by warlike methods. I am confident that the German people aspire to the re-creation of a united Germany which will occupy its rightful place among the family of nations, with whom it will live in peace and harmony.

That is why we have favored in our relations with the German Federal Republic its close association with the several European organizations and the North Atlantic Alliance. Neither they nor we contemplate a revival of a footloose and fancy-free Germany dedicated to military adventure. I am sure such a thought would be as repugnant to any intelligent German as it would be to us. German participation in the North Atlantic Alliance is welcomed by us as a stabilizing influence in Europe, and we find in it a guarantee of peace within a framework of collective security.

Tests of Free-World Determination

We all distinctly remember that with the death of Stalin the bankruptcy of the absolute methods of that powerful leader became apparent. It was confirmed by Mr. Khrushchev's attack against the so-called cult of personality, which was much advertised at the Party Congress in Moscow in 1956. Even before this, however, there were intimations that the world would enter a new era of peaceful coexistence. Internationally the new phase began with a summit conference at Geneva in 1955. Most of the arc of Asia was exposed to Communist blandishments and penetration, and this new policy extended to the Arab nations in the Middle East and had a certain appeal in the wave of nationalism which began to sweep over areas of Africa.

In all of this evolution we should not underestimate the strength of the close ties existing between Peiping and Moscow. The last two Con-

gresses of the Communist Party in Moscow have illuminated that close and powerful alliance. When Peiping saw fit to create a crisis over the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu by opening an unexpected bombardment, Mr. Khrushchev was quick to voice the solidarity of Moscow and Peiping in this undertaking, although we might have doubted the Russian enthusiasm for this adventure, resulting as it did in dismal failure. It provided, however, another test of free-world determination, one of a series to which we will be exposed, I expect, from time to time.

After the failure in the Far East we were faced by pressures in the Middle East, the wooing of the Arabs by the Soviet Union, offering at bargain rates economic and military assistance under the guise of promoting Arab nationalism. But the iron fist in the velvet glove is bound to be detected sooner or later, and there is apparent a certain disenchantment on the part of the Arabs, as well as many Afro-Asians, regarding the longer range Soviet objectives and methods. This does not leave us oblivious to the danger of Soviet infiltration, and, if we had been complacent, events in Iraq would have promptly dissipated our complacency.

We have more recently been treated to the spectacle of Red China's aggression in Tibet. This provides a classic example of the art of deception as practiced by orthodox communism, which entered into solemn agreements with the Dalai Lama to recognize the traditional autonomy of that area. We have witnessed another example of the duplicity to which that doctrine adapts itself, an application of the old maxim that the end justifies the means. The flight of the Dalai Lama before the latest crude resort to military aggression and brutal treatment of an innocent population has provoked worldwide indignation similar to that which followed the Hungarian tragedy in 1956.

The tactics of our adversaries in the creation of a series of crises or at least critical situations vary from case to case. Undoubtedly they reflect a fundamental party doctrine that communism is to be promoted by constant struggle. The capitalist world is to be harassed and if possible thrown off balance by resort to whatever form of attack is best adapted to a given situation, whether it be psychological warfare, economic pressures, internal subversion, or outright military aggression.

For example, in the case of the present controversy over Berlin the original presentation has been a public declaration followed by an official note,² the wording and tone of which are that of an ultimatum. Since that time we have had a variety of expressions from Soviet leaders assuring us that an ultimatum was not intended, that these are merely proposals for negotiation, and that they would welcome our proposals. In considering the Western position on the Berlin issue, it is to be remembered that Berlin does not exist in isolation but is closely related to the broader question of German reunification and European security. If Germany were reunified, the Berlin problem would be absorbed and disappear.

The Soviet Union takes the position that the reunification of Germany can come about only through direct negotiation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the so-called German Democratic Republic rather than on the basis of an agreement among the Four Powers responsible for a German settlement. At the same time the Russians have steadfastly refused to permit the question of reunification to be brought directly to the German people by the process of free elections. The East German regime, as we all know, was imposed on the German people by Soviet fiat and confirmed by the sham of elections based on a single-party system. In no sense can it be considered as an independent democratic regime freely chosen by the people. Its authority rests exclusively on Soviet military and party backing and control. For us to deal directly with this governmental sham and to cooperate in enabling the East German Communist organization to penetrate and eventually control the present free, independent, and prosperous West Germany would defeat the objectives of the free world in Europe. We do not propose to lend ourselves to a form of political suicide for Germany and for Europe.

Disarmament Negotiations

In our relations with the Soviet Union we have gained valuable perspective regarding the difficulty of negotiations with the Soviet Union in our efforts to achieve some progress on the limitation of arms. As you know, disarmament today is a

² For text of Soviet note of Nov. 27, 1958, and U.S. reply of Dec. 31, see BULLETIN of Jan. 19, 1959, p. 79.

complex, cloudy picture with a troubled history. Efforts to resolve the disarmament problem have been actively pursued in the postwar years, and in these efforts the United Nations has played a major role. It was in this forum that the United States, early in the postwar era, offered to share with the world its then total monopoly of nuclear power, but the Soviet refusal to cooperate blocked that plan. To give the disarmament problem urgent study on a priority basis the United Nations, in the early 1950's, created a Disarmament Commission. The Commission in turn, in an effort to bring about speedy progress, created a Subcommittee, in which it was hoped that in this small working group the major powers could devise an agreed formula for disarmament.

The Subcommittee met many times throughout the period from 1952 to 1957, but it was its extended meeting held for many months in London in 1957 that seemed finally to make unprecedented progress toward an eventual solution of the disarmament problem. For a time the attitude of the Soviet representatives at that meeting appeared reasonable. Then suddenly the Soviet Union reversed itself and abruptly refused to continue what had been viewed as hopeful negotiations. Immediately following its refusal to continue these negotiations the Soviet Union announced that it would boycott the Disarmament Commission and the Subcommittee until a formula was devised to give the Communist countries equal representation within the Disarmament Commission. The United States expressed its firm belief that the Commission must reflect, not the demands of any one group but the membership of the United Nations. After prolonged wrangling the Commission, which has not met since the announced Soviet boycott, is now composed of all 81 members of the United Nations.³ In the future Soviet participation in the Commission is expected.

In early 1958, when it became clear that the Soviet attitude for the moment prevented further useful efforts to progress toward disarmament through the United Nations, the United States proposed a meeting of scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain to ascertain whether means could be agreed upon of detecting nuclear explosions. These talks, which were held in Geneva,

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1958, p. 837.

resulted last August in a technical report which made clear the fact that it was feasible to establish a control system to police a test ban.⁴ President Eisenhower then immediately proposed a meeting at Geneva to negotiate an actual suspension of nuclear weapons tests.⁵ These negotiations continue at Geneva and revolve around the Soviet refusal to agree to an effective and impartial inspection system to assure compliance with the agreement reached.⁶

The United States and the United Kingdom prefer to move toward a comprehensive test ban as quickly as possible. However, Soviet insistence on the veto and reluctance regarding the practical features of inspection have prevented agreement up to now. It was in view of this reluctance that the United States and United Kingdom recently proposed that progress to date in the conference be consolidated by all three parties' agreeing to a ban of tests within the atmosphere and under water as a first step, with outer-space and underground explosions and their inherent difficult political and technical problems left for continued consideration as the negotiations proceed.⁷ As these problems were solved these types of tests would be incorporated in the initial agreement. The question of whether the Soviet Union is prepared to modify its position on the veto and other essential control requirements so that progress can be made on an all-inclusive ban is now under active negotiation in Geneva. We hope they will so that a final, lasting agreement can be quickly reached. If they will not modify their position, we shall press again for a phased approach which would ban tests within the atmosphere now as we work toward an eventual total ban on all tests.

Four Lessons Learned

In speaking of our experience in dealing with representatives of the Soviet Union on the question of disarmament and other matters during the past 15 years it can safely be said that we have learned four general lessons:

First, where agreements have not been self-enforcing or have not contained provisions for an

enforcement mechanism, they have not been enforced.

Second, the Soviet Union is capable of exploiting negotiations for other purposes than the reaching of a meaningful agreement. Their negotiations may simply contemplate a propaganda effect or a tactical distraction or diversion from other issues. Communists, we find, are willing for tactical reasons to sign meaningless agreements which might influence a target nation or people to relax and lower their guard.

In the third place, the disarmament record alone shows that Soviet representatives are tough, relentless bargainers, who make concessions only after they have exhausted every means of gaining advantage. They may use panic, discouragement, internal division, false hopes, or fatigue as weapons in the waging of diplomatic warfare.

In the fourth place, the record shows that, in the few instances where there has been a mutual desire for agreement, meaningful agreements are reached. Where those agreements provide for means of enforcement, they have been enforced.

Therefore we find that the prospect of eventual agreement, of a possible relaxation of tensions, is not hopeless and should not be abandoned. A decade and a half of negotiations has plowed much ground and explored many possibilities. An early Greek philosopher, speaking of the answer to any difficult problem, said: "You must hope against hope or you will not find it." John Foster Dulles put it this way: "We must take as our working hypothesis that what is necessary is possible," and his stouthearted example teaches us the soundness of that injunction.

Negotiation is another area in which the example of Saint Robert Bellarmine serves us well. A spirit of justice, temperateness, and charity and the willingness he demonstrated to stand by his convictions—that attitude will also help us keep open the door to the eventual achievement of a firmer world peace.

Iran, a Loyal Free-World Ally

One of the cardinal principles of our present foreign policy is that relating to collective security. It has become obvious to all that in the present world situation and due to the existence of unconventional weapons of staggering destructive

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 452.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1959, p. 700.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 704.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1957, p. 267.

potential it is impossible for any one nation to support, alone, the burden that is necessary in this test for survival. Therefore this country has entered into security agreements with over 40 other nations and into a system of worldwide alliances.

An outstanding example of a loyal and courageous free-world ally bordering on the Soviet Union is one of the world's oldest monarchies—Iran. With some several centuries of experience with varying pressures from their large neighbor to the north, the Iranians have learned how to preserve their independence by demonstrating their willingness to cooperate as a neighbor without surrendering their rights to their own integrity and independence. Soviet policies toward Iran, varying little in ultimate objective from those of czarist Russia, have alternated tactically between enticements and threats. Today the Soviet Union is embarked upon a massive propaganda campaign against Iran and its Government which in threadbare, familiar Communist jargon has at times amounted to virtual incitement to revolt.

Whatever superficial attraction claims of Soviet devotion to the cause of the downtrodden, exploited masses may have for the peoples of countries more distant from the U.S.S.R., they ring hollow for Iranians, who recall Soviet attempts in 1945 and 1946 to set up a separate Communist state in the province of Azerbaijan supported by Soviet troops who refused to leave Iran following World War II in clear defiance of written obligations to do so.

Iran has announced to the world its intention to devote its own energies in cooperation with its neighbors to preserving its independence through membership in the purely defensive alliance known as the Baghdad Pact. The United States has on a number of occasions affirmed its intention to take appropriate steps to assist Iran to resist any aggression directed against that country. Most recently the United States reiterated its interest in Iran's continued integrity through the conclusion on March 5, 1959, of a bilateral agreement which expressed our determination to continue to assist Iran for this purpose as well as for the promotion of its economic development.⁹

⁹ *Ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1959, p. 416.

This is an example of democratic cooperation among countries united in a desire for a peace in which the rights of all nations, large and small, are respected.

Principles of Freedom

I think it is important in our effort to win the peace to be alert to the dangers to our religious ideals and form of society and not to adopt a purely defensive attitude in the face of Communist dangers. In concentrating on anticommunism we run the risk of neglecting the affirmative features of our own program and social evolution. We lend ourselves to a vast amount of free publicity of efforts by the leaders in the Sino-Soviet bloc to promote their ideology and atheistic approach to world problems. The cause of the free world would be advanced far more effectively if we would concentrate on the constructive features of our own free-world programs, the creation of better, more advanced standards of living, scientific and industrial progress, and the development of those spiritual values which are the background of our society. The impulse of our activity must not be merely reaction to Communist moves any more than we should permit ourselves to be paralyzed by fear of Communist attack or seduction by Communist blandishment. We live in a highly competitive universe, and the values on which we rely are being put to test daily. It is our responsibility to make those values attractive to the masses of our free-world populations in a way which will eliminate the temptation to yield to Communist propaganda by the discontented.

President Eisenhower told the Nation in March ¹⁰ that

We have lived and will continue to live in a period where emergencies manufactured by the Soviets follow one another like beads on a string.

What the President was making clear is that the pressure we face is not an isolated event but a continuing process. We cannot end the pressure; but we will only increase it by yielding to it.

Our policy for dealing with the total challenge of communism is based upon three broad princi-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1959, p. 467.

ples. I suppose you might call them three principles of freedom.

The first principle is to remove the profit from aggression. This can only be done by means of a realistic capability to penalize aggression and a fearless determination to use that capability if need be. We have such a capability now, and we intend to keep it.

The second principle is to limit the opportunity of subversion. This is done by exercising our leadership to encourage political cooperation, to raise the standard of living for the masses, to improve social conditions and promote development trends among the free nations. Opportunities for Communist advance are essentially negative occurrences. They come about where freedom fails. Our best security lies in making sure that freedom does not fail.

The third principle is to maintain the pressure for peace. Despite every rebuff and disappointment we must continue, as we are continuing, with persistent and imaginative efforts to reduce East-West tensions, to demonstrate that aggression, as at Quemoy and Matsu, is not profitable, and to resolve the issues which threaten peace.

These principles are interlocking. Military capability permits us to resort to diplomatic initiatives and acts as a shield for constructive growth. Economic advance and political stability, in turn, provide firmer support for military defense and diplomatic bargaining power.

And underlying the strength of these three principles of freedom is the foundation which can only be provided by strong and continuous public support. This support depends upon citizens who have a realistic understanding of the continuing nature and the total nature of the Communist competition. It requires a deep faith in the values for which we stand and a capacity to communicate that faith. It requires a capacity to understand the needs of a changing world and the ability to adapt our policies and our lives to these changes. It requires a willingness to take risks in the cause of peace with honor. It requires immense patience, a willingness to share and sacrifice. And above all it requires that spirit of justice, of temperateness, and of charity, in dealing with friends or with enemies, for which the memory of Saint Robert Bellarmine today, more than 500 years after his birth, is revered.

Tributes to John Foster Dulles

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959, died at Washington, D.C., on May 24. Following are statements in tribute to him made by President Eisenhower, Secretary Herter, and Acting Secretary Dillon.¹

President Eisenhower

White House (Gettysburg, Pa.) press release dated May 24

John Foster Dulles is dead. A lifetime of labor for world peace has ended. His countrymen and all who believe in justice and the rule of law grieve at the passing from the earthly scene of one of the truly great men of our time.

Throughout his life, and particularly during his eventful 6 years as Secretary of State, his courage, his wisdom, and his friendly understanding were devoted to bettering relations among nations. He was a foe only to tyranny.

Because he believed in the dignity of men and in their brotherhood under God, he was an ardent supporter of their deepest hopes and aspirations. From his life and work, humanity will, in the years to come, gain renewed inspiration to work ever harder for the attainment of the goal of peace with justice. In the pursuit of that goal, he ignored every personal cost and sacrifice, however great.

We, who were privileged to work with him, have lost a dear and close friend as all Americans have lost a champion of freedom. United, we extend to Mrs. Dulles, to her children, and to all members of the Dulles family our prayers and deepest sympathy, and the assurance that in our memories will live affection, respect, and admiration for John Foster Dulles.

Secretary Herter

Press release 358 dated May 24

The death of John Foster Dulles will sadden all peoples devoted to the cause of peace with justice. He was a great statesman, firmly dedicated to high principles, who worked incessantly to promote the national interests of the United States and a comity of law among nations. He truly gave his life in the service of his country.

¹ Mr. Dillon was Acting Secretary of State in the absence of Secretary Herter, who was attending the Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva.

The policies for which he strove so valiantly will live on for the day of general acceptance.

Those of us who had the privilege of working closely with him feel a sense of deep personal loss. I know I speak for all members of the Department of State and the Foreign Service in saying that they too mourn his loss.

I am hopeful that developments here in Geneva will permit of my returning for the funeral.

Acting Secretary Dillon

Press release 357 dated May 24

The cause of freedom has suffered a grievous loss in the death of John Foster Dulles. He was a truly remarkable man whose intellectual powers, personal courage, and high moral integrity won him the respect and admiration of free men everywhere. He will be sorely missed by all who believe, as he so fervently believed, that a peaceful and stable world order can be achieved under liberty and justice if we steadfastly pursue policies founded on the principle that "there is a rule of law which is above the rule of man."

U.S. Loan To Assist Finnish Bank To Finance Building of Small Ships

Press release 355 dated May 22

The United States on May 22 signed an agreement lending the equivalent of \$5 million in U.S.-owned Finnish currency to the Industrial Mortgage Bank of Finland to enable the bank to finance construction of small vessels for the Finnish coastal and near-seas fleet.

The ships, which will not exceed 2,500 dead-weight tons in size, will be built in Finnish shipyards.

The loan is being made by the International Cooperation Administration from finnmarks received by the United States from the sale of agricultural commodities, such as wheat, tobacco, and cotton, to Finland under provisions of Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act. The loan was made to the Industrial Mortgage Bank, a private corporation, at the request of the Government of Finland, which is guaranteeing repayment.

The Finnish Ambassador, Richard R. Seppala, signed the loan agreement on behalf of the bank as well as his Government. Lynn U. Stambaugh, first vice president of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, signed for the United States. The Export-Import Bank will administer the loan for ICA.

The loan will be repayable over a period of 30 years at 4 percent interest if repaid in dollars and 5 percent if repaid in finnmarks. There is a 4-year grace period for principal repayments.

Development Loans

Chile

The United States and Chile on May 20 signed at Washington an agreement whereby the Development Loan Fund will lend Chile \$300,000 to finance design engineering for a new international jet airport at Pudahuel. For details, see Department of State press release 347 dated May 20.

Philippines

The U.S. Development Loan Fund on May 18 announced basic approval of a loan of up to \$5,300,000 to the Bataan Pulp and Paper Mills, Inc., a privately owned firm in Manila. For details, see Department of State press release 338 dated May 18.

On May 19 the DLF signed a \$5 million loan agreement with the Central Bank of the Philippines to finance foreign exchange costs of privately owned small industries in acquiring equipment, materials, and services. For details, see Department of State press release 342 dated May 19.

Sudan

The U.S. Development Loan Fund and the Sudan-American Textile Industry, John Theodoracopulos Co., Ltd., a private corporation with offices in New York, N.Y., signed an agreement on May 22 at Washington, D.C., whereby the DLF will lend the corporation \$10 million to help finance construction and equipment of a textile plant in Khartoum, Sudan. For details, see Department of State press release 353 dated May 22.

The World Health Organization and World Peace

by Francis O. Wilcox

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

The National Citizens Committee for the World Health Organization is making an invaluable contribution through its efforts to promote a wider public understanding of the importance of the programs of that Organization. A broad public understanding of this kind is essential if the World Health Organization is to have the support it needs to function effectively. I congratulate you on the job you are doing.

Strong support for the United Nations and its various specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization, represents a fundamental part of American foreign policy. The American people firmly believe in the United Nations and the purposes and principles of the charter. They believe in the solid work the specialized agencies are doing to help lay the foundations of a just and lasting peace.

For peace, if it is to have real meaning for the common man, must be far more than the mere absence of armed conflict. It must reflect, in a constructive way, man's universal desire to build a more abundant life.

In the WHO Constitution the nations have declared that: "The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and States."

These are not empty words. There is ample evidence already that the World Health Organization, along with the other agencies of the United Nations system, is making real progress in developing firmer foundations for world peace.

¹ Address made before the National Citizens Committee for the World Health Organization at Washington, D.C., on May 7 (press release 312).

WHO and the United Nations System

The achievements of the World Health Organization as a force for peace can best be reviewed against a background of the dual and complementary nature of the entire United Nations system.

Most of us who attended the San Francisco conference in 1945 had two main objectives in mind.

The first of these objectives was to give real substance to the concept of collective security so that world peace could be maintained. To this end the Security Council was given the authority to move quickly and decisively in order to put down aggression. And the General Assembly was created to serve as the organized conscience of mankind.

We all know that so far this effort has been only partially successful. The effectiveness of the Security Council, which was predicated on a unanimity of views among the permanent members, has been sorely hampered by the excessive use of the veto. Consequently we have had to strengthen the role of the General Assembly. In addition the free world has found it necessary to enter into regional pacts which supplement the United Nations structure as a means of forestalling aggression. Even so, the United Nations has settled a good many serious disputes and on several occasions has actually stopped shooting wars.

Our other major objective at San Francisco was to devise means for closer international cooperation in advancing the social and economic well-being of mankind—better education, better food, better health. Most of the delegates there were of course vividly aware of the devastations of World War II, then not ended. But beyond that, and even more profoundly, they were aware¹

of the stark contrast which has existed since the days of the industrial revolution, a contrast between conditions of life for a minority of mankind and those of the majority. I refer to the ever-widening gap between the living standards of the more fortunate peoples of the United States and Europe, and the subsistence or even starvation level of two-thirds of mankind in what we now term the underdeveloped countries. They knew that there would be no chance for stable peace unless all peoples had the opportunity to advance in human, social, and economic terms.

In reporting on the work done by the San Francisco conference, the United States delegation said:

The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace.

Thus the United Nations pledged themselves to cooperate to solve economic, social, educational, health, and related problems. They also agreed that the various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities regarding these problems, should be tied in with the United Nations through the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations system represents an effort to prevent the application, through conflict, of our grim technology of destruction; it also represents an effort to further the application, through cooperation, of our potentially boundless technology of human welfare.

Since San Francisco we have gone through a protracted period of cold war. But there has been enough peace to enable the specialized agencies to begin their important tasks. For many years the attitude of the U.S.S.R. toward these agencies was decidedly cool. While in some cases participating in their founding or revival after World War II, the U.S.S.R. for many years thereafter refused to participate or cooperate in them. They had nothing for the specialized agencies but ridicule and criticism.

So far as the World Health Organization is concerned, the U.S.S.R. withdrew in 1949 and did not resume active participation until 2 years ago. Today, however, we find the Soviets actively participating in WHO and most of the other specialized agencies, with the usual declarations of their

willingness to cooperate. We must face frankly the fact that we do not know as yet to what extent this renewed participation is sincere or to what extent it may be an extension, in new form, of the cold war.

We do know, however, that the U.S.S.R. is now engaged in what appears to be a worldwide economic and social offensive, designed to increase Soviet influence in the underdeveloped areas of the world. It may be that renewed Soviet activity in the specialized agencies is part and parcel of this worldwide campaign. For our part we sincerely believe that the specialized agencies, rightly used, open great opportunities for cooperation, for learning to work together, and for building more pathways to genuine communication among the people of the world. We intend to continue cooperating in them for their technical and humanitarian objectives, and we hope that all other countries, including the U.S.S.R., will do likewise.

Achievements of the World Health Organization

Some critics complain that the United Nations is a one-way street through which American support is given and little or nothing is received in return. I know of no more convincing evidence of the falsity of this assertion than the record of the World Health Organization. Let us consider this record for a moment.

The fact is that the WHO programs benefit the health of all Americans in many ways. The direct benefits are important, because they mean that WHO is effectively expressing a central principle of international organization, namely, that the members should work together to achieve their common goals. In practical terms this means that each nation makes financial and technical contributions to the extent that it is able to do so, and also that each nation in return receives real benefits. This principle of mutual effort and mutual returns is at the heart of international cooperation. Its successful observance is assurance to Americans, as to others, that the cooperation is valuable and the organization worth while. The direct benefits which a people derive from membership in an organization give them a vested interest in it and its patterns of cooperation, the fruits of which they can see in an immediate and tangible way.

First, the World Health Organization makes

possible the rapid reporting of disease outbreaks almost anywhere in the world. Radio stations in many countries cooperate in broadcasting WHO epidemiological bulletins—a most concrete example of international cooperation. The Public Health Service makes constant use of the information so obtained and in doing so helps to protect the American people against disease which might spread to our shores. As disease outbreaks are reported, almost universal application of quarantine measures protects Americans at home and abroad against infection. In this jet age germs can travel faster than sound. These measures combine maximum protection against spread of disease with minimum interference with travel and trade.

Second, the World Health Organization promotes the exchange of ideas and makes available to the United States up-to-date information on health and medical advances in other parts of the world. Free international exchange of experience and ideas is of course close to the heart of progress in health, as in other fields. WHO does this through publications, expert seminars and conferences, and a series of 36 expert advisory panels, with a total membership of over 1,400 health experts, including 300 in the United States.

As part of this effort WHO helps to organize cooperation between laboratories in different countries, including the United States, for exchange of information and samples and for coordinated research projects. International laboratory networks now cooperate under the aegis of WHO in influenza, poliomyelitis, other virus diseases, intestinal parasites, brucellosis, and other fields.

Third, through recommended common names for drugs, recommended specifications, and preparation of biological standards WHO helps assure ready identification of commonly used drugs throughout the world and comparable standards of purity and potency for drugs and biologicals. The value to the growing numbers of Americans traveling or living in other countries, as well as to our pharmaceutical profession and industry, is obvious.

Fourth, the fundamental way to protect Americans against contracting infectious disease is to control or eradicate it at its source, anywhere in the world. Through its technical assistance pro-

grams WHO is greatly helping countries to accomplish this purpose.

Each of these services which I have listed benefits the health of Americans in a variety of ways. Most of these programs by their very nature are international in scope. They cannot possibly be carried on by only one or two countries. They are among the basic reasons for international cooperation in health and for the existence of a World Health Organization through which nations pool resources and work together.

Even if there were no other reasons for United States membership these services would repay many times our contributions to WHO. After serving on the United States delegation to the 10th World Health Assembly in 1957, Congressman [Charles A.] Wolverton of New Jersey stated:

I know of no money that is being spent with greater effect than the small resources of the WHO. Truly, it is changing the world for the better, building a strong and more resourceful human race.

WHO and the Complex of Misery

This statement highlights for us the fact that WHO programs also benefit the health of all other peoples. The majority of mankind is still victim of the age-old complex of misery—a complex composed of illiteracy, starvation, disease, apathy, poverty. Therefore disease should be high on the list of our targets of attack. The attainment of health as a normal condition of life for all men, and as a basis for human advance, does not in itself guarantee conditions of peace. However, without attacking disease and other key factors of the complex of misery, there can be no hope of stable peace. It is clear, therefore, that the United States has a vital and a direct interest in the benefits which other countries receive from membership in the World Health Organization.

When the World Health Organization was founded 11 years ago it assigned first priority to an effective control of major communicable diseases, the age-old scourges of mankind. The economically advanced countries of the Western World had already demonstrated that we have the technical means to curb these diseases. Now the underdeveloped nations also, with essential aid and guidance from WHO, have made a magnifi-

cent attack on them. Malaria has been reduced by 50 percent, from 300 million to 150 million cases a year. WHO and UNICEF have tested over 200 million persons and vaccinated 80 million against tuberculosis. Today this dread disease is on the decline. Real progress has been made toward the elimination of yaws. Approximately 55 million people have been examined and 16 million successfully treated. Substantial progress also has been made in combating other scourges—yellow fever, leprosy, trachoma, smallpox.

This steady advance in the war against disease does not make headlines. But when the historian of the future assesses the events of our era, he will surely credit these concerted campaigns for the total elimination of diseases as among the most remarkable and important achievements of mankind. Their significance for the future is, in my opinion, greater than many of the highly publicized political debates in the Security Council and the General Assembly.

This progress means that men are able at last to use their energies for their own betterment, not for feeding the parasites of disease. This new releasing of men's energies for their rightful uses is an event of the utmost human and economic importance.

But many other things are necessary for good public health besides the campaigns against mass infectious diseases. Attacking these is like attacking the worst symptoms of *ill* health. It is necessary, but it is also necessary to go further and build the enduring bases of *good* health. Consequently, as a result of agreement on the part of the member countries the World Health Organization now gives priority to helping countries organize adequate national and local health services. This it does through assistance in public health administration, maternal and child health, public health nursing, environmental sanitation, and, perhaps most basic of all, in training.

In its first 10 years WHO awarded almost 8,000 training fellowships to medical and health personnel. The need for well-trained personnel remains great, but this is a tangible start. It represents an average of almost 100 health workers, per member country, who have received better training. Many countries have previously had almost none at all. The worldwide services of WHO—disease reporting, quarantine, mobilization, and exchange of knowledge and the rest—

are constantly increasing in value to the underdeveloped areas.

This is an unparalleled record of worldwide achievement for health. It provides clear proof of what cooperative action can achieve. The health problems which remain are still tremendous. But they are not disheartening. We have confidence that they can be surmounted. The World Health Organization and other programs which complement it, such as the International Cooperation Administration, have already demonstrated that these problems are not insoluble.

WHO as Coordinator and Catalyst

Naturally the World Health Organization has not achieved this record entirely on its own, nor would it aspire to do so. Many national and international organizations are working to raise levels of health around the world. The WHO has established effective working relations with numerous organizations, such as the national health agencies of member states, ICA, and regional health agencies like the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, which is also WHO's regional office for the Americas.

In addition WHO has accorded affiliated status to some 40 international nongovernmental health organizations. Within the United Nations system, too, various agencies are working together with WHO, evolving effective patterns of relationships wherever common problems and needs appear. The United Nations itself is promoting projects such as housing and community development. Associated agencies have responsibilities in such undertakings as the health of mothers and children, nutrition, occupational health, medical sciences, and sanitation of airports. I have in mind such agencies as the United Nations Children's Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the International Civil Aviation Organization. The 12th World Health Assembly is expected to approve a relationship agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Atomic energy is part of the broad field of the health aspects of radiation, in which WHO can make an important contribution.

In these many ways WHO fulfills the role of "coordinator on international health work" assigned to it by the member nations. Acting only

by consent, through its influence and prestige, WHO has become a rallying point and guide in international efforts for better health. Its programs have likewise become part of a broader range of interrelated action, in the effort to apply the technology of human welfare to the conditions of life. To emphasize health alone would be self-defeating. Simultaneous action on all fronts—education, agriculture, health—assures the greater effectiveness of all, as a basis for peace.

The same increasing sense of community among nations, through learning to work together in health and related fields, is also taking place within nations. Peoples everywhere are demanding a better life. In my travels in Asia I have found that the peoples of that vast continent are becoming increasingly aware of the fact that they need not accept filth, disease, and misery as normal conditions of life. This new attitude will have a profound impact on the world in the future.

As a result many governments are learning to face up to the complex of misery and to take measures to attack it on many fronts. Here, too, WHO and the other specialized agencies of the United Nations are a help and a guide. Through example and advice they encourage the process of working together on the national plane. In the long run this development can have far-reaching consequences for the effectiveness of governments in helping peoples to meet their basic needs. Meeting human needs is, after all, the ultimate justification of government, and without this there can be little cohesion in society, little sense of community in the world.

WHO and International Cooperation

This brings me to what I believe is the most fundamental relation of the World Health Organization to world peace, particularly from the viewpoint of the United States. The activities of WHO, by their nature and their progress, are helping nations to acquire habits and attitudes of working together and a vested interest in cooperation. These habits and attitudes are, I am sure, "transferable" and will subtly but surely have a beneficial influence on the political climate in the world.

I am aware that such statements are challenged as not being in accord with the realities of power

politics. Yet I am convinced that, even though the specialized agencies are young in years, their activities afford a real potential for the advancement of peace and cooperation. They are building new links between nations which represent the realities of a new kind of politics—the politics of human welfare rather than power. If we can prevent the outbreak of thermonuclear war in the near future, these agencies can significantly reduce its likelihood in the long run.

In this connection I like to recall the words of Dr. Raymond B. Fosdick some 14 years ago, when he was president of the Rockefeller Foundation, a pioneer in the field of international health. At that time he defined incisively the contributions which an organization like WHO could make to world peace. Let me quote him.

The community of nations has got to have a kind of intellectual and spiritual integration before it can be absolutely sure that the forces of violence are under control. Consequently there must be developed for international life new areas and techniques of cooperative action. . . . We need rallying points of unity, centers around which men of differing cultures and faiths can combine, defined fields of need or goals of effort in which by pooling its brains and resources the human race can add to its own well-being. . . .

Dr. Fosdick saw hope only "as we begin to build, brick by brick, in these areas of common interest where cooperation is possible and the results are of benefit to all." Public health, he said, can be an important area of common interest, a rallying point of unity.

It has long been firm United States policy to support the evolution of the specialized agencies as part of the framework of cooperation for peace. Even while World War II was being fought the United States and its Allies were engaged in extensive and painstaking study and planning which ultimately resulted in the creation of the United Nations. One of the major premises of this planning was that, if nations could learn to cooperate in the technical fields of mutual interest, the result might produce a sense of world community which would reduce the likelihood of war. As we have seen, this concept was then built into the United Nations Charter. It has furnished the basis for the progress which has been made in the social and economic advancement of mankind.

Nowhere has this concept of international cooperation been more effectively implemented than in the efforts of the World Health Organization.

It is proving its worth to the United States through direct benefits to our health. It is providing similar benefits to other member countries. It is a vital element in the growing pattern of international cooperation for the advancement of peoples everywhere. It is fostering the habit among nations of working together. In this way the WHO is working as a real force for world peace.

The Challenge to WHO

This, however, is not enough. The World Health Organization must continue its advance into this challenging frontier. Like all live and growing human agencies it faces many difficult problems. Most urgent of these is a more effective use by member nations of the World Health Organization for the improvement of health conditions. Only by this increased use will the Organization grow stronger and more effective. But there are other pressing needs as well.

First, we believe that the World Health Organization must consolidate its major programs in disease eradication, environmental sanitation, and building health services while simultaneously moving to meet new health needs. Malaria eradication still needs special priority. The worldwide campaign has made sufficient progress so that difficulties are becoming apparent in techniques, administration, and the allocation of resources. But I am confident that the nations involved, with the help of WHO, will overcome these obstacles. Malaria will disappear from the face of the earth.

At the same time WHO, with United States support, is preparing to meet newer health needs. As more knowledge is gained about the chronic diseases—cancer, heart disease, diabetes—it becomes evident that more international cooperation is required to probe their causes, cure, and prevention. This applies also to mental illness, for in developing our material comforts we have also vastly increased the mental stresses and strains to which our organism is exposed. The plan which WHO has drawn up with our aid, providing for expansion of WHO's unique means of stimulating and coordinating research activities, will be considered by the 12th World Health Assembly.

Mankind's "population explosion," as it is often called, is also part of the dynamic challenge to WHO. In 1798 Malthus wrote with some conviction that population pressures would always

tend to keep man at subsistence level. He observed pessimistically that for this reason Jenner's proposals for vaccination against smallpox, published the same year, were a waste of time. Now it is again clear that health measures add to population pressures. President Eisenhower in his message to Congress on the mutual security program and the realities of 1959² referred to the new and striking

... revolution in medicine, nutrition, and sanitation ... increasing the energies and lengthening the lives of people in the most remote areas. As a result of lowered infant mortality, longer lives, and the accelerating conquest of famine, there is underway a population explosion so incredibly great that in little more than another generation the population of the world is expected to double.

This means that in our lifetime the earth's population may reach the astounding total of 5 or 6 billion people. In the same message the President again pledged that the United States would continue "to support and promote the accelerating international fight against disease" and estimated that the total international health expenditures of the United States Government in the next fiscal year will approach \$100 million. There are compelling reasons for our contribution.

Some people—like Malthus—may argue that the WHO, by improving health standards, is making the world's population problem worse rather than better. Why should we make an all-out effort to increase man's life span, the argument runs, when there are already more people on this earth than we can maintain at a satisfactory standard of living?

To me this argument is just about as convincing as the sound of a lead dollar. It is unthinkable that we who have the means to health would attempt to withhold it from others. We have always believed in the dignity and worth of the human being and the full development of his potentialities. This includes good health.

But, in addition to the moral arguments, health would seem to be an absolutely essential prerequisite for any sound economic development program. Where people are disease-ridden and debilitated they obviously cannot make any substantial contributions to their country's economic progress. WHO is thus giving people in many nations strength to build and grow the things they need for a more abundant life.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1959, p. 427.

There is, then, a satisfactory solution to the dilemma we face. The answer, the only answer, lies in moving forward on all fronts of social and economic development. Our technology is progressing at a prodigious rate, and men are now committed to that rate of advance throughout the world. Indeed there are encouraging indications that the production of food, while still not sufficient, is beginning to keep pace with—and perhaps even exceed—population growth for the first time in modern history.

This is indeed a heartening development. It presages the time when the Malthusian doctrine will be completely discredited by man's technical ingenuity and his determination to win out over the forces of nature.

For us to admit that mankind cannot sufficiently apply the technology of human welfare is to admit fearful defeat. We *can* apply it, in peace and progress, for the ultimate fulfillment of human potentialities. Agencies such as the World Health Organization are at the forefront of this great struggle to better man's lot in life.

The Role of the United States in Africa: Our Interests and Operations

by James K. Penfield

Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs¹

Africa is not only a fascinating part of the world but what happens there is of very great importance to all of us. I am therefore particularly pleased that you have so hospitably invited me to come here tonight to address the Mundelein College Institute on this challenging continent.

Africa is 3½ times as large as the United States. It includes about a fifth of the land area of the entire world. It has a population of some 220 million people of all races, speaking over 700 different languages or dialects. Most important, it is in a state of profound political, economic, and social change. Current developments there are as fundamental as those which occurred during the industrial revolution in Western Europe or following the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. The *New York Times* recently said editorially that "one of the outstanding phenomena of the contemporary world" is what it calls "the sudden, thrilling, agonizing upheaval of the African races after countless centuries of primitiveness, subjection and isolation from the civilized world."

What can one say about an area so vast and changing? In considering this question it seemed

to me that it might be interesting to summarize for you our own American interests and operations in Africa. In the process I can perhaps also give you some idea of the changes taking place there and what they mean to us.

To start with, may I cite a few generalities? It's helpful to me in thinking about this continent of such immense diversity to divide it, like Caesar's Gaul, into three parts. First, there is the Mediterranean littoral north of the Sahara. Here we have a group of political entities including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, most of them newly independent countries and all of them with essentially Arab populations. It is interesting to note, however, that these African peoples, except for the Egyptians, consider themselves different from the Near Eastern Arabs, and many will tell you that they are as much a part of the "African personality" as the Africans south of the Sahara, whose leaders have recently been doing much talking about this continental attribute. The political life of this northern African area at present is dominated by the complexities of the struggle in Algeria. We all hope that this bitter dispute can be settled on a political basis which all can accept and that this area may thus be given the opportunity to develop in peace, with France as its friend and partner.

¹ Address made before the Institute on African Affairs at Mundelein College, Chicago, Ill., on May 15 (press release 325 dated May 13).

The second great division is the area of East, Central, and South Africa stretching from Kenya in the north to the Union of South Africa in the south. This part of Africa is under white domination, and the black man's demand for freedom and independence is not easy to satisfy because in much of the area there is a settled white population which also considers Africa its home and is unwilling to give up its political power. The immediate problem here is how to reconcile these conflicting forces.

Finally, we come to West Africa. Here there is no white-settler problem and independence is being achieved at a breathtaking tempo. Of course some areas are more developed and more politically mature than others, and we certainly do not believe in independence without regard to the capability to assume its responsibilities. But there seems to be no stopping the tide, and it is indeed thrilling to see peoples long under colonial rule assuming the responsibilities of independence and joining the family of nations.

To illustrate how rapid this development is and how the tempo is increasing, let me review for you the postwar African independence timetable.

In December 1951 Libya became independent. Four years later, early in 1956, Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia followed suit. In March 1957 the former British colony of the Gold Coast became the independent state of Ghana. Last fall Guinea voted to reject the new French Constitution and became fully independent. Next year Cameroun, Togo, Nigeria, and Somalia are all slated for independence. Thus in just 9 years we will have seen 10 new African nations born or reborn, half of them in the last 3 years of this period. And this is not the end. Rather it is just the beginning.

Now tonight we are considering our own American interests in this dynamic continent. But, lest my recital give you a distorted idea of the relative importance of these interests, I must emphasize at the outset that statistically our role is a minor one. In terms of trade, administration, political and economic development, and education the European colonial or former colonial powers have contributed far more to Africa than have we. Moreover these powers are continuing their interest and contributions, adapting them in an enlightened and sympathetic way to the rapidly changing situation. We regard this as natural, and we welcome it. We have no desire

to interfere with the fruitful development of these new relationships, and in fact we are taking particular care to avoid slipping into such a position, which could only result in friction and rivalry contrary to the best interests of the new African states, of our European allies, and of ourselves.

U.S. Interests in Africa

Historically our first interest in Africa was both humanitarian and religious.

Way back in 1772 Samuel Hopkins published a plan for training free Negroes of the United States as colonizers and missionaries for Africa. By 1794 Congress began enacting laws to end the infamous slave trade, and by 1818 this trade was formally defined as piracy. In 1821 Congress passed a law authorizing the President to undertake "proper negotiations" with residents of the coast of Africa as agents for receiving free American Negroes.

Finally, in 1822, after several abortive attempts to establish a colony in West Africa, President James Monroe appointed Dr. Eli Ayres as colonizing agent and dispatched the U.S. Navy schooner *Alligator* to escort the colonists to the shore of what is now Liberia. Dr. Ayres and the commander of the *Alligator* "energetically persuaded" the tribal chiefs to sell the sponsors of the expedition, the American Colonization Society, a strip of land along the coast. The settlement established here, named Monrovia in honor of the President who had done so much to make the project possible, subsequently became the capital when the free and independent Republic of Liberia was proclaimed in 1847.

We also had a very early interest in North Africa. In 1786 Thomas Barclay of Pennsylvania negotiated a treaty with Morocco, and later, in 1825, the Sultan gave us a building in Tangier which is our consulate general there today. The United States Government has owned and occupied it longer than any other property abroad, and I suspect that there are few Government buildings in this country which can match this 134-year record. Then there was the American consul in Zanzibar who was among the first to greet the new British consul when he first arrived on that exotic island where East meets West in an aroma of cloves.

Since the early 19th century American missionary activity on the African Continent has been ex-

tensive. Today more than 6,500 American missionaries, representing scores of home offices, boards, and orders in the United States, are at work throughout Africa.

Our interest in African trade is also an old one, dating from the old New England clipper-ship days. As a matter of fact the coarse cloth in common use in East Africa is known to this day as *americani*. Today United States trade with Africa totals about \$1.2 billion annually, and our investment in the continent amounts to almost \$1 billion.

Strategically Africa is of utmost importance in 20th-century geopolitics. It is clear that a friendly Africa, particularly North Africa, is vital to the defense of Europe and NATO's southern flank. To deter aggression and strengthen overall free-world security the United States maintains important naval and air bases in Morocco, an air base in Libya, and communication facilities in Ethiopia.

The Suez Canal closing in 1956 demonstrated the importance of friendly African ports along the Cape of Good Hope route as an alternative for oil shipments from the Persian Gulf to the free world and for uninterrupted contact with the Middle and Far East.

Also important from the strategic, as well as the commercial, point of view is the fact that Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, provides the United States with many of its most essential raw materials, such as uranium, cobalt, diamonds, columbite, gold, and manganese, to name but a few.

In addition to the interests I have already cited Americans have a very keen and natural popular interest in a continent to which 10 percent of our population can trace its ancestry. This interest has always been endemic, one might say, but recently it has been growing at a very encouraging pace. American, including Negro American, educators, businessmen, Government officials, newspapermen, and even tourists are increasingly playing a sympathetic and constructive role in African development.

U.S. Objectives in Africa

The United States interests in Africa, which I've just described, constitute a very natural and logical basis for our policies and objectives there. The United States seeks to demonstrate to the

African peoples a friendly interest in their welfare for their own sake.

We seek to encourage the sound and orderly development of the continent in a manner consistent with free-world ideals.

We recognize that membership in the 20th-century family of nations carries with it responsibilities; that the interdependence of the world community is an established fact which must be appreciated in Africa, too; and that all peoples permanently resident in Africa have legitimate interests for which they can rightfully demand fair and just consideration.

The African people look to the United States for assistance in achieving social, economic, and political progress. They look to us for spiritual leadership and sympathy for their aspirations, and they expect us to apply our historic ideals to our foreign policy. It is our objective to live up to these expectations.

U.S. Operations in Africa

The United States expresses its official interest and carries out its policies in Africa through the maintenance of diplomatic and consular representation; through participation in the United Nations and its various organizations active in Africa; through economic and technical aid, military assistance, and developmental loan programs; information and educational exchange operations; cultural and athletic presentations; trade missions; and participation in international trade fairs. In other words we are using in Africa today on an increasing scale all the normal tools for the conduct of international relations which we employ elsewhere throughout the world. But it has not always been this way. The history of American official concern with Africa is a long one, but until recent years its record of intensity and consistency has been very spotty.

I've already mentioned Thomas Barclay and his 1786 treaty with Morocco, as well as that early consul at Zanzibar. There are also other examples of sporadic official American interest and activity throughout Africa. For instance we appointed an "Agent" to the States of the Congo Association in 1884, and in 1903 we sent a "Commissioner and Plenipotentiary" to Ethiopia. However, by and large substantial official U.S. attention to Africa is a relatively recent development.

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Within the State Department Ethiopia and the north African littoral forming part of the old Ottoman Empire were traditionally the responsibility of the old Near Eastern Division, originally organized to handle our relations with the two eastern empires, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman. But up until just over 20 years ago the rest of Africa was almost completely ignored by official Washington. When we were forced to put our minds to an African question—as occurred from time to time in connection with Liberia, for instance—the question was usually handled as an esoteric and momentary diversion by some junior officer of the Western European Division. Fortunately, in view of Africa's later importance to us during the war, responsibility for much of the continent was transferred to the Near Eastern area in 1937 and a responsible official was assigned to working full time on African problems. In 1943 a separate organizational unit, the African Division, was set up within the Near Eastern Office, and since then official interest and attention to Africa has increased steadily, culminating in congressional authorization last summer for an additional Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.² On August 20 the President appointed to this post Mr. Joseph C. Satterthwaite, who had previously served as Minister at Tangier and as Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. The Bureau of African Affairs is now fully operating with a staff of over 70 persons in Washington and is charged with responsibility for our relations with most of the continent on the same level as the Department's other four geographic bureaus, those concerned with Europe, the Far East, the American Republics, and the Near East and South Asia.

In the field the U.S. now has 10 embassies, 14 consulates general, 14 consulates, and 2 independent USIS offices³ in Africa. Six offices—5 new consulates and 1 new embassy—have been opened since last January alone. Their locations will give you an idea of the extent of our present official interest in Africa. The Embassy is at Conakry, capital of the new state of Guinea, and the consulates are at Freetown, Sierra Leone; Lomé,

capital of Togo; Brazzaville, capital of the Congo Republic; Kaduna, capital of the northern region of Nigeria—all in West Africa; and Tananarive, capital of the Malgache Republic, doubtless more familiar to you as Madagascar.

It's interesting to note the changes which have taken place in this list in the last 20 years. In 1939, on the eve of World War II, we had 4 legations, 3 consulates general, 8 consulates, and 1 consular agency, a total of 16 offices as compared with 40 today. Curiously, however, at Djibouti, French Somaliland, we had a consular agency in 1939 but we are not represented there today.

All our field offices perform the traditional diplomatic and consular duties. Autonomy is developing at such a pace in some of the still technically colonial areas—Nigeria and Somalia, for example—that our consulates general there are already carrying many of the negotiating and representational responsibilities of embassies. Also our offices in the field act as bases for the operation of the various economic, technical cooperation, and military assistance programs, as well as information and educational exchange programs.

Aid Programs in Africa

The United States is currently providing economic or technical assistance to some 13 African countries and territories. In addition we give military assistance on a modest scale to Ethiopia and Libya.

Our economic assistance under the Mutual Security Act has risen from less than \$62 million in fiscal year 1958 to a planned \$88.3 million for the coming 1960 fiscal year. These dollars are usually used to purchase commodities which are sold in the country for local currency which, in turn, is then used in development projects in the country.

The Development Loan Fund (DLF), a relatively new Government agency, has approved loans to Liberia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Somalia and has additional African loans pending. The Export-Import Bank has been lending African states and territories up to \$15 million annually for development projects and just last month approved a substantial loan for Liberia. Surplus agricultural commodities have been provided to several African states and territories.

We also have a technical cooperation program in Africa for which over \$20 million is being budgeted for the coming fiscal year, almost twice

² For announcement of the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs, see BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1958, p. 475.

³ The overseas offices of the U.S. Information Agency are known as USIS (U.S. Information Service).

the level of 2 years ago. Under this program there are about 650 American technicians at work in Africa compared to only about half that number in June of 1957.

Technical cooperation activities are most numerous in the fields of agriculture—Africa's primary economic enterprise—and in vocational, primary, and teacher education. Increasing emphasis is now being placed on multilateral cooperation. This includes creating regional training centers, studying regional resources, and financing attendance of students from several countries at the American University of Beirut.

United States economic and technical assistance has already accomplished much in Africa. Schools have been established and others strengthened to provide badly needed agricultural and other vocational skills. A good start has been made in demonstrating measures to make better use of scarce water supplies in arid or semiarid regions. Inroads have been made on debilitating diseases such as malaria and trachoma, and tools and technical knowledge have been provided to push the fight to create healthy populations. A start has been made in preparing inventories of African resources and in improving transportation and communication facilities. Also activities are developing to encourage the expansion of private business enterprise in Africa through such measures as small-industry loan funds, development banks, and agricultural credit institutions.

In addition to maintaining its own assistance programs the United States provides 40 percent of the funds of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which has already loaned African states and territories more than \$400 million since its operations began. We also contribute a large proportion of the funds allocated to the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program, which will spend about \$4 million in African projects this fiscal year.

The European countries with African dependencies, however, have been providing at least \$600 million a year for economic assistance and investment in Africa. So you can see that, as I mentioned earlier, although American assistance is increasing and already has made significant contributions to Africa, it still plays a very secondary role on the continent. This is quite a contrast to the situation in many other parts of the world where we have substantial aid programs and should be borne in mind by those who

advocate more aggressive American economic and political policies in Africa.

USIA

The United States Information Agency currently operates in 26 cities in 13 African countries.

USIS programs seek to explain American foreign policy and particularly American policy toward Africa to the African peoples. Through press and radio output, libraries, films, lectures, English teaching, and similar activities, USIS attempts to promote an understanding of the various aspects of American life including our racial attitudes and progress in racial integration. A major objective is to counter the Communist propaganda effort in Africa.

As part of its program the Agency produces media specifically tailored to African audiences. Since 1957 alone it has produced five documentary films for Africa and is periodically producing an African newsreel entitled "Today" which is seen by approximately 2 million Africans. The Agency also produces a monthly newspaper in Accra, distributes over 100,000 copies in English-speaking West Africa, and hopes soon to expand its distribution to the Sudan and Ethiopia.

The Voice of America sponsors a half-hour daily shortwave news and features program for Africa. USIS reading rooms and libraries provide literate Africans with the opportunity to learn more about American culture and history. In some places these facilities provide a unique means for large groups of Africans to learn something about American thought and life. In four African countries USIS sponsors English lessons, which also provide a wonderful opportunity to present many aspects of American life to local leaders.

Exchange of Persons Program

Closely allied to USIS operations is the State Department's international educational exchange program, which has been in effect in Africa since shortly after World War II. Just since 1957, 567 African leaders, specialists, educators, and students have visited the United States under this program, and 118 American teachers, lecturers, and specialists have visited Africa. This year exchanges are being carried out with 24 independent countries and dependent areas on the African Continent, and we hope for a 50 percent increase in this program in 1960. Distinguished visitors

have included the Chief Justices of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and of Ghana, a prominent doctor and civic leader from Nairobi, two Federal members of Parliament and two tribal chiefs from Nigeria, an Assistant Secretary of State from Liberia, and the Cameroun Minister for Economic Affairs.

On the sending side 63 American grantees are now assigned to Africa. Americans are teaching English in Morocco at the Government's request. American specialists have been serving in Ethiopia as consultants in setting up a college-level program and in training Ethiopian teachers. And American teachers and lecturers have been teaching courses in such fields as agricultural engineering, American literature, nutrition, and biology in almost a dozen African educational institutions.

Cultural and Athletic Presentations

Under the auspices of the President's Special International Program, the Department of State has been sending athletic teams and coaches as well as cultural presentations of all types to Africa during the last 3 years. A five-man mixed American track team, part white and part colored, is even now touring in Africa under this program. Parry O'Brien, world shotput record holder, Don Bragg, world pole-vault champion, and their teammates are having great success competing with and coaching Africans.

Some of you may have noticed a recent New York Times story telling how the Westminster Singers, a choral group of 22 graduates of the Westminster Choir College of Princeton, New Jersey, have been making people happy all over Africa with a sentimental little Negro song called "Li'l Liz, I Love You." Other groups and individual artists who have toured parts of the African Continent in recent years range all the way from the San Francisco Ballet to the Wilbur de Paris Jazz Ensemble and the Boston Celtics.

Trade Fairs and Trade Missions

Also under the auspices of the President's Special International Program, American pavilions and display stands have for several years been sponsored at the Casablanca, Tunis, and Mogadiscio international trade fairs. These original pavilions, employing all the skills of American showmanship and originality, are designed to tell the story of American industrial and com-

mercial progress in a way that is helpful to the countries in which the displays are mounted. Displays include such eye catchers as Circarama and an inflatable house. The current exhibit at Casablanca is housed in a plastic and aluminum geodesic dome and is attracting everyone from the King of Morocco to Berber tribesmen from the hills dressed in their traditional long flowing robes. I wonder what they think when they gaze at gadgets like a stereophonic juke box or a science exhibition which includes such spectator sports as exploding sawdust with hydrogen peroxide shot from a water pistol?

United States trade missions of American business and financial experts have also been sent to several African countries. Right now two of them are traveling in Morocco and Nigeria. These missions have proved to be successful two-way channels—bringing knowledge about American financial and business methods to Africa and information about potential African markets and fields for investment to American businessmen.

Private U.S. Activities in Africa

United States governmental operations are most certainly not the only American activities in Africa. In fact, in many places the American presence is principally felt and known through private missionary, business, and other activities.

Religious and Philanthropic

As I noted earlier, not only have the 6,500 American missionaries now at work in Africa brought the blessings of Christian ethics but they have clearly made a major contribution to the basic medical, educational, and community facilities of the continent. In most cases they have pioneered these fields and penetrated far into the African interior to bring their services to wholly uncivilized populations. Even today they continue to be responsible for a large part of the education which Africans receive.

The rollcall of private American foundations, institutes, committees, and educational institutions engaged in African programs and activities is impressive. Headed by the Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller, and other well-known foundations, it also includes many, many other smaller or more specialized organizations, both lay and religious. Still others are planning to enter this field and are certainly welcome, as the demand for such private assistance far exceeds the available re-

sources. To give you an idea of the scale of the foundation activity, since 1927 the Carnegie Corporation of New York has spent well over \$5 million on activities in Africa and for those relating to Africa in the United States and the United Kingdom. The Ford Foundation has similarly spent over \$21½ million since 1952 on its sub-Saharan African programs—programs which are to be continued in greater magnitude. Annual African budgets of the numerous missionary groups range up to more than \$1 million.

Educational

Another related activity is the role being played by more and more American universities and colleges in offering courses and organized studies in African affairs here in the United States to educate Americans in African history, problems, and potentialities. As you all doubtless know, in March of 1957 the African Studies Association was founded to facilitate communication among scholars in America interested in Africa and to stimulate and facilitate scholarly research on Africa. The first annual meeting of the association was held at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, last September and was attended by more than 170 social scientists and others interested in African research.

Private Business

I'm afraid I've already overloaded you with facts and figures. Moreover, tomorrow you are to have the privilege of hearing Mr. [Bernard] Blankenheimer of the Department of Commerce, who will give you a detailed survey of the role of American private business and capital in Africa. For our purposes tonight, therefore, a brief statement will suffice.

As I mentioned earlier, American capital invested in Africa amounts to almost \$1 billion; but this is a figure subject to considerable interpretation, as almost a third of it, for instance, represents American-owned tankers sailing under the Liberian flag. In any event there are two things to note. Although American investment in Africa constitutes only a small proportion of total U.S. investment abroad—some 4 percent—it increased between 1953 and 1957 by 55 percent. Secondly, although it is heavily concentrated in petroleum distribution and mining, it is also varied, ranging all the way from running an airline in Ethiopia to manufacturing canned goods

in South Africa to an interest in a chewing gum factory in Morocco.

Our foreign trade with Africa (excluding Egypt and the Sudan) has increased since the end of the war, that is, between 1946 and 1957, by over 60 percent to its current level of \$1.2 billion a year. About 3.4 percent of our exports go to Africa, and 4.2 percent of our imports come from there. The bulk of the exports go to the Union of South Africa, but our imports come from all over the continent. Curiously, to those of us conditioned to thinking of coffee in terms of Brazil, the largest import item, almost 30 percent of the total, is coffee.

The dynamic changes taking place in Africa will undoubtedly have a great effect on these patterns of investment and trade, changes which we believe will offer great opportunities for American private enterprise. There is also the human side of this activity. The prospects for greater tourist and private cultural exchanges between Africa and the United States increase with each passing year. The natural beauties of Africa, its diverse and often pleasant climates, and its numerous tourist attractions inevitably will result in an increase of tourism. In turn we hope and expect more and more Africans will be coming to the United States as businessmen, statesmen, students, scholars, professors, and just plain tourists.

Conclusions

We have reviewed at some length American interests, objectives, and operations in Africa. We have noted—a fact obvious to the most casual observer—that Africa today is in a state of dynamic development which challenges the entire free world to sit up and take notice.

We simply cannot afford to sit idly by and see this great continent drift into chaos, confusion, or communism. At the same time we cannot set ourselves up as omniscient judges of what's best for Africans, some of us clamoring for immediate independence without regard for limiting political, economic, and educational factors, while others demand a tortoise-like, teacher-knows-best approach to autonomy. The trend is clear, and much has already happened. To prove this statement I have only to recall the independence timetable I have already recited. One of the results of this progress is the emerging "African personality" which I also mentioned earlier. Afri-

cans are proving that they can run their own affairs, not the way non-Africans would do it but so effectively that they feel justified in demanding the opportunity to work out their own salvation.

We Americans can readily conclude that the United States and the new Africa are inevitably bound together by many solid and lasting mutual interests. It is our role—and yours—to prove to Africans the positive advantages of cooperation with the United States and the West. To do so we must be prepared to give emerging Africa both sympathetic support and tangible assistance so that its great potential will be achieved in a manner which will benefit both them and us all.

CONGRESS

President Recommends Membership in Inter-American Bank

*Message of President Eisenhower*¹

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I herewith submit to the Congress the Agreement for the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank together with a Special Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems recommending United States participation as a member of such Bank.² Representatives of the United States took an active part in the inter-American meetings which formulated the Agreement. I urge that the Congress enact legislation authorizing the President to accept membership in the Bank for the United States and to assume the subscription obligations prescribed in the Agreement.

¹ White House press release dated May 11 (H. Doc. 133, 86th Cong., 1st sess.).

² *Special Report of the National Advisory Council on the Proposed Inter-American Bank*, with an appendix which includes the Final Act of the Specialized Committee for Negotiating and Drafting the Instrument of Organization of an Inter-American Financial Institution, convoked by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, and the text of the Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank; available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.

The establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank and our participation in it will be a most significant step in the history of our economic relations with our Latin American neighbors. It will fulfill a long-standing desire on the part of the Latin American Republics to have an Inter-American institution specifically designed to promote the financing of accelerated economic development in Latin America. At the Buenos Aires Economic Conference in August and September of 1957, the United States supported a resolution calling for a study of possible solutions for the problems of financing economic development.³ In August of 1958 the United States indicated that it would be prepared to consider the establishment of a development institution for Latin America⁴ and in September of that year an informal meeting in Washington of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics recommended that a specialized committee of governmental representatives negotiate and draft an instrument for the organization of such a development institution.⁵ A Specialized Committee, thereafter established by a Resolution of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, was convened at the Pan American Union in Washington on January 8, 1959,⁶ and devoted three months of continuous effort to the preparation of the Agreement which I now lay before the Congress for its approval.

The proposed institution is well designed to serve the needs of the Latin American Republics on a sound financial basis. The bulk of its assets, \$850 million, which are subscribed for the capital stock of the Bank, are to be used to make or facilitate loans on banking terms, repayable in the currency in which the loan has been made. Each member republic is called upon to make a significant subscription to the capital of the Bank. Of the \$850 million in authorized capital stock, \$400 million is for paid-in shares to be paid for in installments over a period of approximately three years. Half of each installment is payable in gold or dollars, and half in the national currency of the members. The United States subscription to the paid-in capital is \$150 million. The Latin

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 16, 1957, p. 463, and Sept. 30, 1957, p. 539.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1958, p. 347.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 13, 1958, p. 574.

⁶ For a U.S. statement made at the final plenary session on Apr. 8, see *ibid.*, May 4, 1959, p. 646.

American subscriptions for such capital total \$250 million.

The balance, \$450 million of callable capital, will constitute a guarantee of borrowings by the Bank in capital markets and would only be actually expended if the Bank were unable to meet its commitments. It is planned that the Bank will rely heavily on raising funds from private sources for the financing of sound economic development projects in Latin America. The United States portion of the callable capital is \$200 million.

It should be noted that the Agreement expresses the intention of increasing the capitalization of the Bank by an additional \$500 million after September 30, 1962, if the increase is approved by a three-fourths vote in the Board of Governors. The increase would be in the form of callable capital and the United States share would be approximately \$200 million. This arrangement was included in recognition of a deep conviction on the part of the Latin American representatives that definite provision should be made in the Agreement for an increase in the capital of the Bank at an early date. The United States representatives agreed that such an increase would be desirable but believed that it would be wise to have an initial period of experience with the Bank's operations before the additional capital was subscribed. Accordingly, if the Bank's operations are established on an effective basis in accordance with expectations, the United States will in good faith be committed to vote for the increase and subscribe to its share of the increased capital.

The Agreement also establishes a Fund for Special Operations to be financed by specified contributions by all of the member countries, half in gold and dollars and half in the national currencies of the members. Its initial resources will be \$150 million. The United States contribution of \$100 million is payable in installments, the first of which will be \$50 million. The Fund is established for the making of loans on terms and conditions appropriate for dealing with special circumstances arising in specific countries or with respect to specific projects, where normal terms of lending would not be appropriate. Loans by the Fund may be made repayable in whole or in part in the currency of the borrowing country. The Agreement carefully segregates the resources of the Fund from the capital resources of the Bank so as not to jeopardize, in any way, the financial

soundness of the institution and its ability to raise funds in the capital markets.

It is proposed that the funds necessary to meet the initial portion of the United States subscription to the Bank be provided by a no-year appropriation, to be expended at such time after its enactment as may be desirable taking into account the active role which the United States has played in formulating the proposal for the Bank.

The charter authorizes the Bank to provide its members, and private entities in the territories of the members, with needed technical assistance. Particular attention is given to technical assistance in the fields of preparation, financing, and execution of development plans and projects, and the training of personnel specializing in the formulation and implementation of development plans and projects. These are two areas where there has long been a need for additional assistance and the facilities which will be provided by the Bank should be very helpful to member countries in utilizing their international borrowing capacity for the development projects most essential to their economies. The representatives of the Latin American countries, as well as those of the United States, have demonstrated an awareness of the necessity of making adequate provision for safeguarding the resources of the institution in order that its future existence as an important factor in the development of the hemisphere may be assured. In this respect the Agreement follows, in many aspects, the charter of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It is anticipated that the new Bank will work closely with existing sources of public credit, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Export-Import Bank, and the Development Loan Fund.

The Special Report of the National Advisory Council, submitted herewith, describes the Agreement creating the Bank in greater detail.

I am strongly of the opinion that because of the following general policy considerations the United States should support the creation of this Bank for Latin America:

- (1) The special relationship, historical, political, and economic, between the United States and the Latin American Republics;
- (2) The pressing economic and social problems

in the area resulting from a rapid rate of increase in population and widespread desire for improved living conditions; and

(3) The desirability of an institution which will specialize in the needs of Latin America, which will be supported in large part by Latin American resources and which will give the Latin American members a major responsibility in determining priorities and authorizing loans.

I urge the Congress to enact promptly legislation enabling the United States to join with the other members of the Organization of American States in establishing the Inter-American Development Bank which will foster, in a sound and efficient manner, more rapid advance by the people of the nations south of our border as they strive to improve their material well-being.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 11, 1959.

Belgian-American Solidarity

His Majesty King Baudouin of the Belgians made a state visit to the United States May 11-31. Following is the text of an address he made before a joint session of Congress on May 12.¹

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen, I who am a young man come from a country old enough to have been spoken of proudly by Julius Caesar.

I come to a country which for centuries God kept hidden behind a veil until its appointed hour when it took into its young arms the people of the Old World.

America has been called a melting pot, but it seems better to call it a mosaic, for in it each nation, people, and race which has come to its shores has been privileged to keep its individuality, contributing, at the same time, its share to the unified pattern of a new nation.

I rejoice in the honor given to me by this assembly, an honor which deeply moves the hearts of the Belgian people. After all, your country and mine have much in common. In both, the state exists for the people, not the people for the

state. In both, rights and liberties take their origin, not in the government but as your Declaration of Independence states, in the unalienable rights given by the Creator.

Gratitude for Aid and Support

Time has not dimmed the gratitude of my people for the sympathetic attitude and practical help from America in World War I. It was the American Commission for Relief formed by Brand Whitlock, under the Presidency of Herbert Hoover, which saved the population of Belgium from the horrors of starvation. The hunger we then had for bread is now a hunger to be everlastingly grateful for that great work of mercy.

Permit me also to register justifiable pride in recalling that it was upon our Belgian soil in the last war that General McAuliffe wrote the shortest and most unforgettable diplomatic note ever sent in wartime. As you all know it, I shall not tax your memory by repeating it.

Since that day the name of Bastogne has ever been cherished in our minds. The graves of your gallant soldiers are now part of our sacred soil. Their sacrifice will never be forgotten.

When my great-uncle, the late King Leopold II, undertook with Stanley his bold adventure of bringing civilization into the unexplored regions of central Africa, the United States—through Congress—was the first Government to proclaim the humanitarian nature of this great enterprise, and to recognize the independent state of the Congo as a friendly Government.

During the 75 years that have followed, Belgium has done her utmost to bring to the Congo security and a more human life.

Today all my countrymen join in the desire to raise the population of Congo to a level that will enable them freely to choose their future destiny. As soon as they are matured, as soon as they have received the loving care in education that we can give them, we shall launch them forth on their own enterprise and independent existence.

Quest for a Lasting Peace

There are two other points, ladies and gentlemen, for which I crave your indulgence: the first is on peace, the second on youth.

Peace, as you know, is the tranquillity of order. Mere tranquillity can be cold war, but the tranquillity of order implies justice.

¹ *Congressional Record*, May 12, 1959, p. 7179. For announcements of King Baudouin's itinerary, see Department of State press releases 285 of Apr. 24 and 313 of May 7.

Perhaps never before has peace been so difficult to achieve as it is today. At other periods, the possibility of war endangered our homelands and our home. Today war endangers our minds and our hearts. The older imperialism sought the conquest of lands; the new seeks the mastery of intellects.

The peace for which we have to labor is not just to preserve our possessions, but our very personalities.

The preservation of peace has, therefore, become in our day the work not only of the heads of governments, but of the entire citizenry of every nation. Since it is not only our bodies but our minds that are at stake, peace is made from two directions: one from the conference table to the people, the other from the people to the conference table. And as the differences between governments often are greater than the differences between peoples, the peace within our hearts is the greatest guarantee of peace in the world.

I am here to register the solidarity between the peoples of Belgium and America in the fond hope that all human beings, wherever they be, may join with us in the prayer of your great Lincoln that government of the people, for the people, and by the people may not perish from the earth.

Dedication to Youth and Peace

A word about youth.

Youth is the first victim of war, the first fruit of peace. It takes 20 years or more of peace to make a man; it takes only 20 seconds of war to destroy him.

In a certain sense America is the land of youth, because it dedicates more of its energies, talents, money, and science to the birth and preservation of life than any other country in the world.

Where better can the free peoples of the world look for the averting of war and death than to your Nation so vibrant with the love of life? It is unthinkable that those who spend so much to save life would ever seek to destroy it. Even the money spent on the defense of peace we see as a deterrent to those who would endanger human life.

Not only I, but all the youths of my country, most willingly adhere to your reverence for life. Nor shall our confidence in you be misplaced, for what is written on your coins, I have read in the hearts of the American people: "In God we trust."

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and IAEA Sign Agreement for Cooperation

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 321) announced on May 11 that an agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency was signed that day at Vienna, Austria. Harold C. Vedeler, Acting U.S. Representative, signed the agreement for the United States, and Sterling Cole, Director General, signed for the IAEA.

The agreement will make it possible for the Agency to draw on the 5,000 kilograms of uranium 235 pledged to the Agency by President Eisenhower at the conference which approved the IAEA Statute at United Nations Headquarters in 1956.¹

In addition to the 5,000 kilograms, the United States has pledged to match the total amount of special nuclear materials made available by other members of the Agency up to July 1960.² The Government of the U.S.S.R. is making available 50 kilograms of uranium 235, and the Government of the United Kingdom has agreed to supply 20 kilograms. As the United States has agreed to match the amounts made available by other members, the total amount of uranium 235 that is now transferable by the United States to the Agency is 5,070 kilograms.

The special nuclear materials covered by this agreement will be furnished by the United States at the rates charged by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for domestic distribution. However, special nuclear material worth up to \$50,000 may be transferred during any calendar year without charge for research on peaceful uses or for medical therapy. The United States also undertakes to assist the Agency in obtaining source material from persons under U.S. jurisdiction and agrees to accept for reprocessing both special nuclear

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1956, p. 813.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1957, p. 637.

and source material made available by the United States under this agreement.

The IAEA has agreed to assure that any material, equipment, or facilities transferred pursuant to this agreement will be used only for peaceful purposes.

United States and Pakistan Ratify Income-Tax Convention

Press release 349 dated May 21

Instruments of ratification were exchanged on May 21 at Karachi bringing into force an income-tax convention between Pakistan and the United States.

The convention between the United States and Pakistan for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income was signed at Washington on July 1, 1957.¹ The convention follows in general the pattern of conventions now in force between the United States and numerous other countries for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income. It is designed to eliminate obstacles to the international flow of trade and investment. It contains provisions relating to business, investment, and personal-service income, official salaries, pensions and annuities, remuneration of teachers, remittances to students and apprentices, and interest received by the State Bank of Pakistan and the Federal Reserve banks of the United States. It also contains, as is customary with such conventions, provisions regarding administrative procedures, including exchange of information, for giving effect to the convention.

The second sentence of article XV(1) of the convention as signed contained a provision, commonly referred to as the tax-sparing provision, under which the amount of income tax and super-tax by which an American enterprise's Pakistan tax was reduced by Pakistan law, as an incentive for new investment, would be treated, within certain limits and on certain conditions, as though paid for foreign-tax-credit purposes. After the signing of the convention the relevant Pakistan law was repealed.

On July 9, 1958, the United States Senate gave

¹ BULLETIN of July 22, 1957, p. 172.

advice and consent to ratification of the convention subject to the reservation "that the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Article XV shall not be ratified." The convention was ratified by the President subject to that reservation. The text of the reservation was communicated by the U.S. Government to the Government of Pakistan, which accepted the reservation. This constituted in effect an understanding that the convention, upon entry into force, would be modified in accordance with the reservation so that the second sentence of article XV(1) is excepted from the operation of the convention to the same extent as though that sentence were deleted.

The convention, entering into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification, is effective in the United States for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1959. It is effective in Pakistan for "previous years" or "chargeable accounting periods," as defined in Pakistan law, beginning on or after January 1, 1959.

International Wheat Agreement Signed at Washington

Press release 350 dated May 21

From April 6 until and including April 24, 1959, the International Wheat Agreement, 1959, was open for signature at Washington. During that period the agreement was signed in behalf of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium (for the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, Belgian Congo, and Ruanda-Urundi), Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of South Africa, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, and Vatican City.

Of the signatories mentioned above, Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, and the United States are designated in article 24 of the agreement as exporting countries. The others are designated in article 25 as importing countries.

It is provided in the agreement that it will enter into force on July 16, 1959, as to parts I and

III-VIII, and on August 1, 1959, as to part II, between the governments of those countries which have, by July 16, 1959, accepted or acceded to the agreement, provided that such governments hold not less than two-thirds of the votes of the exporting countries and not less than two-thirds of the votes of the importing countries, as specified in the agreement.

The agreement is open to accession by the governments of certain countries in behalf of which the agreement was not signed.

The International Wheat Agreement, 1956, presently in force, will expire by its own terms July 31, 1959. The new agreement, like that of 1956, is a 3-year agreement and is designed to assure supplies of wheat to importing countries and markets for wheat to exporting countries at equitable and stable prices.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Law of the Sea

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.¹

Ratification deposited: Afghanistan, April 28, 1959.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Accession deposited (with declaration): Sweden, April 27, 1959.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, and 3363, respectively.

Ratification deposited: Ceylon, February 28, 1959.

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3365.

Accession deposited: Ceylon, February 23, 1959.

Whaling

Protocol amending the international whaling convention of 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Washington November 19, 1956. Entered into force May 4, 1959.

Proclaimed by the President: May 14, 1959.

¹ Not in force.

BILATERAL

Colombia

Agreement extending the agreement of February 6 and March 14, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3611), for establishment and operation of a rawinsonde observation station on San Andrés Island, and providing for establishment, operation and maintenance of a rawinsonde observation station at Bogotá. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá January 8 and May 8, 1959. Entered into force May 8, 1959.

Denmark

Agreement relating to a shipbuilding program in Denmark. Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen May 8, 1959. Entered into force May 8, 1959.

Muscat, Oman, and Dependencies

Treaty of amity, economic relations, and consular rights, and protocol. Signed at Salalah December 20, 1958.¹

Ratified by the President: May 8, 1959.

Pakistan

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington July 1, 1957.

Ratifications exchanged: May 21, 1959.

Entered into force: May 21, 1959.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 18-24

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to May 18 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 312 of May 7, 321 of May 11, and 325 and 326 of May 13.

No.	Date	Subject
338	5/18	DLF loan to Philippines (rewrite).
*339	5/19	Educational exchange (Ceylon, Nicaragua).
*340	5/19	Cultural exchange (Europe, Middle East).
†341	5/19	Parsons: "The Development of Our Common Interest in the Pacific."
342	5/19	DLF loan to Philippines (rewrite).
*343	5/20	Office staff of Secretary of State.
344	5/20	Czechoslovakia credentials (rewrite).
*345	5/20	Cultural exchange (Cuba).
†346	5/21	Hanes: White House Conference on Refugees.
347	5/20	DLF loan to Chile (rewrite).
*348	5/21	Willoughby: House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.
349	5/21	Income tax convention with Pakistan.
350	5/21	International Wheat Agreement, 1959.
*351	5/21	Cabot nominated Ambassador to Brazil (biographic details).
†352	5/22	Henderson: "The Price of Peace and Progress."
353	5/22	DLF loan to Sudan (rewrite).
*354	5/22	Possible summit site.
355	5/22	Loan to Finnish bank.
*356	5/24	Funeral arrangements for Mr. Dulles.
357	5/24	Dillon: death of Mr. Dulles.
358	5/24	Herter: death of Mr. Dulles.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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